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RECOGNIZING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
DAVID LANGE*
In a celebrated lecture on the law of copyright, Zechariah Chafee suggested
that objections to intellectual property are probably rooted in a more general dis-
taste for private property. He acknowledged, however, that differences among spe-
cies of property can justify differences in their treatment in law., In this brief
essay, I will recall some of the attributes of intellectual property that justify partic-
ular concern when new rights are being recognized or existing ones enlarged. I
will argue that the growth of intellectual property in recent years has been uncon-
trolled to the point of recklessness. And I will suggest that recognition of new
intellectual property interests should be offset today by equally deliberate recogni-
tion of individual rights in the public domain. 2
I
The chief attribute of intellectual property is that apart from its recognition in
law it has no existence of its own. It is in fact as well as in definition the stuff of an
intellectual, rather than a feeling, accord. Lacking tangible substance altogether,
its boundaries cannot be recognized through the medium of the human senses. In
this respect the subject matter of intellectual property is unlike the subject matter
of more conventional forms of property which have in common an underlying
attribute of tangibility and are in consequence susceptible to some form of sensory
perception. 3
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1. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 510 (1945). See also B. KAPLAN,
AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 74 (1966). I am indebted to members of my 1981-82 class in Law
and the Arts-upon whom I tested some of the ideas in this essay-for the reference to Chafee in this
setting.
2. A word is in order about terminology. I am aware that the term "property" is of doubtful utility in
the context of rights and interests like the ones I propose to consider. See, e.g., B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at
74. But I shall use it in this essay generally to call attention to the attribute of exclusivity which is of
concern to me. See Brenner, What's In A Name and Who Owns It?, 6 BARRISTER 42, 44 (1979) ("[W]e tend to
call that which one can sell (or prevent others from selling), 'property' "); f Arnold, A Philosophy on the
Protections Afrded By Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Unfair Competition Law: The Sources and Nature of Product
Simulation Law, 54 TRADE-MARK REP. 413 (1964).
3. I take these observations to be common ground, though I have the uneasy feeling that.I have seen
them expressed in substantially these terms before. If so, I have nonetheless been unable to locate the
source. Meanwhile, similar observations can be found. E.g., Note, Copyright. Moral Riht-A Proposal, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 795 (1975) ("The theory of copyright as property is not easily molded ino the
traditional concept of property: e.g., it is not possessory and it is not perpetual . . . [nor is it] property in
the material product created. . .'). See also Patterson, Private Copyright and Publi Communication.- Free Speech
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Of course, it is this distinction, an elementary one readily understood by all
intellectual property lawyers, which makes the subject challenging and fun. How
richly conceptual an undertaking it is to have to recognize the existence of an
interest in the very act of protecting it. And yet if one does not exercise restraint,
how preposterous an undertaking it becomes as well. Tom Wolfe's observations on
a recent development in American art come to mind:
In the late 1960s the Conceptualists began to ask: Suppose the greatest artist in the history
of the world, impoverished and unknown, had been sitting at a table in the old Automat at
Union Square, helping himself to some free water and hoping to cop a leftover crust of
toasted corn muffin or a few abandoned translucent chartreuse waxed beans or some other
item of that amazing range of Yellow Food the Automat went in for-and suddenly he got
the inspiration for the greatest work of art in the history of the world? Possessing not even
so much as a pencil or a burnt match, he dipped his forefinger into the glass of water and
began recording this greatest of all inspirations, this high point in the history of man as a
sentient being, on a paper napkin with New York tap water as his paint. In a matter of
seconds, of course, the water had diffused through the paper and the grand design vanished,
whereupon the greatest artist in the history of the world slumped to the table and died of a
broken heart, and the manager came over, and he thought that here was nothing more than
a dead wino with a wet napkin. Now, the question was: Would that have been the greatest
work of art in the history of the world or not?4
Intellectual property lawyers would side-step the question about the merits of the
work, but would litigate cheerfully, for years, the separate question of its entitle-
ment to protection as property.
The grand design probably would not have been entitled to protection under
the 1909 Copyright Act because of the ephemeral medium in which it was
recorded; 5 and such doubt as the 1909 Act might have allowed would have been
resolved under the 1976 General Copyright Revision: the work clearly was not
"fixed" in a "tangible medium of expression."'6 On the other hand, as against
either Act, the composition could have acquired the protection of common law
copyright-assuming, that is to say, that the State of New York would think it a
suitable object for largesse. 7 There is good reason to suppose that New York
would.
The fact that the composition was recorded in an ephemeral medium would
Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1208-09 (1975); N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT/INFORMATION TECH-
NOLOGY/PUBLIC POLICY, PART I, 55 (1975); Nevins, The Doctinne of Copyright Ambush." Limitations on the Free
Use of Public Domain Derivative Works, 25 ST. Louis U. L. REV. 58, 72 (1981).
4. T. WOLFE, IN OUR TIME 80 (1980).
5. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 1.08[C], 2.03[B] (1981). The term "ephemeral" has
taken on technical significance in copyright law. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-05
(1976),dicussedin 2 M. NIMMER, supra, § 8.06[A], at 8-91 to -92. 1 am of course using it simply as a generic
term.
For an argument that at least some ephemeral works amounting to "art" could be protected under the
1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1976), see J. WHICHER, THE CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS,
73-74, 81-84 (1965). But this argument, it will be seen upon examination, may derive from an essentially
different definition of ephemeral works that is implicit in the 1976 Act's "fixation" requirements. See note
6 infta.
6. "Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression. .. " 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (1977). "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). See generally I M.
NIMMER, supra note 5, § 203[B][2].
7. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 2-18.
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not necessarily disqualify it from protection in that State. Indeed, New York has
given us what is probably the leading case on the subject of common law copyright
in ephemeral works, that State's court of appeals having concluded in dictum, in
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc. ,8 that even a spoken conversation with a
friend may be eligible for common law copyright if sufficiently "marked off" by its
author to indicate his clear intention to protect it. 9 To be sure, in common law
copyright the interest ordinarily springs into being without formal attendants. In
the Hemingway case, however, the marking-off requirement was suggested by the
court apparently in order to permit some initial identification of the subject matter
of the work, as well as to offset the more normal presumption that ordinary speech
is not to be protected. 10 In the case of the dead wino's composition, the problem of
initial identification-which obviously can arise in any ephemeral work-is surely
satisfied by the tracing on the napkin (subject only to niddling problems of proof);
meanwhile, the presumption almost certainly accorded to works of fine art, unlike
conversations, is that they are entitled to protection.'' There is some suggestion in
Hemingway that the ephemeral work may have to meet a standard of creativity
higher than is usually required in copyright. 12 But that suggestion has been criti-
cized 13 and, in any event, a work of art even putatively the greatest in the history
of the world-much less the high point in the history of man as a sentient being-
surely comports with whatever standard is finally to be settled upon.
We can safely conclude, then, that here is an example of intellectual property
in its purest form, entirely conceptual and yet entitled to the full protection of
law-protection, indeed, which in the case of common law copyright may endure
forever. 14 I think it is useful to remember, however, that what we are talking
about, insofar as our senses can perceive it, is still a wet spot on a dead wino's
napkin. Everything else is hypothesis.
8. 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968).
9. Id. at 349, 244 N.E.2d at 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
10. Id. Professor Nimmer, however, is critical of this portion of the opinion: "[Tjo require that the
speaker 'indicate' that he claims copyright in his expression is to create the need for a kind of oral copyright
notice that is difficult to justify. A commendable aspect of common law copyright has been that it, like
copyright systems throughout the rest of the world and unlike statutory copyright within the United States,
requires no formalities." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 2-21 to -22.
11. Cf I M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.08[B], at 2-84 ("[T]he courts are rightly inclined to accept as a
work of art any work which by the most generous standard may arguably be said to evince creativity").
12. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348-49, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255-56, 296
N.Y.S.2d 771, 778-79 (1968).
13. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 2-21: "[lit is most unfortunate to introduce the concept
that only a 'unique intellectual product' may command common law copyright protection. This suggests a
standard of creativity, or of novelty, or of both, that is contrary to prevailing copyright standards, and
which has no greater justification in oral than it does in written works." But see Note, Beyond the Realm of
Copyright.- Is There Legal Sanctuary for the Merchant of Ideas? 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 284, 295-96 n.48 (1974).
See also text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
14. The New York Court of Appeals in Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d at 346 n. 1,
244 N.E.2d at 254 n.1, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 776 n.1, assumed an "indefinite" term for common law copyright
prior to publication. Whether the court would have allowed protection to survive in a published work is
not clear-although, apparently, as far as the Constitution is concerned, a state court may protect pub-
lished work which is neither eligible for nor preempted by statutory copyright. See Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 570 n.28 (1973). Whether it should do so is another, more complicated, issue into which I do
not want to be drawn just now except so far as is necessary to agree that, clearly at some point, perpetual
protection "cheats the public domain." B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 96. See generally id
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The hypothetical nature of intellectual property means that boundaries inevi-
tably prove troublesome to fix. Rarely can we be sure that our perception of a
particular interest is more than an approximation of someone else's perception of
the same interest. And unlike real estate or personalty, intellectual property is
subject to unlimited recreation in the mind of each observer. 15 This causes trouble
enough in the task of establishing recognizable boundaries. But the real difficulty
arises from the fact that more than one person sensibly may assert a proprietary
interest in what looks like the same property. Learned Hand's useful dictum antic-
ipates this phenomenon in the law of copyright and offers a neat solution. 16 But
not all of these conflicts are so easily resolved. Hand's dictum is a rule of copyright
but not of patents. And even in copyright, the theory of derivative works makes no
adequate allowance for the copier whose recreation of an earlier work is also a
substantial improvement. 17
What I would suppose, then, is not that intellectual property is undeserving of
protection, but rather that such protection as it gets ought to reflect its unique
susceptibility to conceptual imprecision and to infinite replication.1 8 These attri-
butes seem to me to require the recognition of two fundamental principles. One is
that intellectual property theory must always accept something akin to a "no-
man's land" at the boundaries; doubtful cases of infringement ought always to be
resolved in favor of the defendant.1 9 The other is that no exclusive interest should
ever have affirmative recognition unless its conceptual opposite is also recognized.
Each right ought to be marked off clearly against the public domain.20
15. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 74.
16. "Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto an 'author'; but if
by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he
would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of
course copy Keats's." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
17. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, §§ 3.01-.07. Cf B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 19-21. Some
recognition of the contributions made by an infringing ("derivative") work is reflected in the rule permit-
ting an apportionment of profits, however. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, Corp., 309 U.S.
390, 403-06, 407-09 (1940). I suspect that this potential loss of works by the "inventive improver" is a
general problem we ought to be more concerned about. See Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion
Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Pub/ic Interest, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 715, 733-38 (1981) (arguing for recog-
nition of "quantitative and qualitative distinctions" among derivative works). See also B. KAPLAN, supra
note 1, at 57-58; Brenner, supra note 2, at 46.
18. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 74-76.
19. Cf Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 988, 1000-01 (1970). But
cf. Derenberg, Copyright No-Man's Land- Fringe Rights in Literamy and Artistic Property, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
770 (1953)(approaching the same terrain from a fundamentally dissimilar perspective and lamenting the
unavailability of greater protection against copying).
20. Cf Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 111, 112 (1980) ("One
man's right is another man's restraint, and to set levels of protection in the intellectual property and unfair
competition fields only in response to the needs of one group. . . distorts the function of these laws...').
See also B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 74-77 (expressing a similar concern for the "public obligation" in
copyright).
Remarkably little direct attention has been paid to the public domain in recent years; there seem to
have been no extended treatments of the subject in its own terms. The Copyright Society's Studies on
Copyright, for example, contains only two references to public domain in the Index, neither of them conse-
quential in terms of general theory. See COPYRIGHT SOCIETY STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 819, 924 (Arthur
Fisher Memorial Edition 1963). The prevailing view probably was expressed by the writer who observed
that "as the phrase 'in the public domain' has been generally used in the cases, it is much less an empirical
datum than simply the reflection of an ultimate legal conclusion." Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of
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II
Until perhaps ten years ago, it might have appeared that these principles were
State Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 927, 967 n. 184 (1974). Compare Krasilovsky,
Observations on Pub&u Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 205 (1967) ("Public domain in the fields of
literature, drama, music and art is the other side of the coin of copyright. It is best defined in negative
terms. It lacks the private property element granted under copyright in that there is no legal right to
exclude others from enjoying it and is 'free as the air to common use' ").
In approaching an area of law as undeveloped as this I have found it necessary to make some arbitrary
judgments about both scope and depth of research. As for cases, I have attempted neither a general syn-
thesis nor extended doctrinal analysis-this for reasons explained in the text. In terms of the literature-in
order to cast a wider net than would otherwise have been possible-I have thought it enough for my
purposes to look closely for public domain-oriented writings back to 1964 when the decisions in Sears and
Compco appeared. See note 23 infra. Beyond that time, I have considered materials only as I already knew
them or as they came to light in the course of reading or otherwise. I am not uneasy about these self-
imposed limits-especially not in view of the tendency for worthwhile works to live on well beyond their
time as research collected in later works-but it is necessary to acknowledge the very real possibility that
something of consequence in the older literature may not have been discovered, and the possibility as well
that in the unsystematic current literature on the subject something else may have gone unappreciated or
unnoticed. These possibilities, inevitable in any research and especially so among diffuse materials, are
particularly real in the case of works on fair use and the first amendment to which I have not paid close
attention-in the former case for obvious reasons having to do with the usual perspective of that subject
matter, and in the latter case for reasons I have explained later in this essay. See note 74 and accompa-
nying text ifra. I have paid somewhat closer attention to the literature of preemption (where one would
expect to find the public domain treated and where, indeed, it has had some useful development, particu-
larly in the work of Professor Brown); but, not supposing that the subject matter of the public domain
ought merely to reflect constitutional doctrines, I have also considered some writings in the history and
philosophy of intellectual property; and, I can report with misgivings, I have gone on some excursions into
the land of that knave of torts, unfair competition, and its neighbor-in-darkness, trademark law, which
have contributed so much to the debasement of intellectual property in this century but which, not alto-
gether paradoxically, have produced some useful literature-this literature I have attempted to discover
while exercising a necessary selectivity. In the field of publicity law I was already reasonably well-versed
and so it was convenient to extend that research further; I believe that the collected cases and literature
(arranged, in the notes of synthesis, by my research assistant Paul Kramer) reflect more nearly the whole of
the field than is true of the other research areas touched on in this essay. Finally, I have left patent law
almost entirely alone; whatever public domain problems may be lurking in this field seem to be the least of
our concerns just now.
I have not attempted in this essay to formulate a general public domain theory, although one inevitably
has begun to suggest itself. See note 137 infra. I have simply presupposed a universal acknowledgement of
what amounts to a dark star in the constellation of intellectual property and I have hoped to encourage a
wider concern for its definition in case law and literature alike.
Meanwhile it is clear that the existing literature is now in at least a rich progenitive state:
Professor Brown of Yale deserves particular mention for his persistent expressions of concern for the
public domain, some of which I discuss more fully in later notes. Seegenerally Brown, nifration." A Cheerful
Requiemfor Common Law Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1070 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brown, Unifica-
lion]; Brown, Publ&ation and Preemption in Copyright Law.- Elegiac Reftcttns on Goldste 2 v. California, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1022 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brown, Elegiac Reections]; Brown, Product Simulation. A
Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1216 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Brown, Product SimulationJ.
An earlier effort to summarize the public domain deserves particular mention also:
Regardless of the variations of terminology occasioned by the limitations of the English language
in treating with such evanescent abstractions, the cases generally exhibit a surprising uniformity of
approach and conception. The courts wholeheartedly recognize that ideas, new or old, when once
disclosed must be kept "free as air" for all to use. They recognize further that the vast accumulation
of human experience, the character of man and his world in all its varying phases, and the relation-
ships of each to the other and to other men and other things, not only in the general but the specific,
are not and cannot become the "property" of anyone regardless of how they are expressed. These
things are the universal heritage, the public commons, from which all may freely draw sustenance and
which all may use as seems most satisfactory to them.
For that reason the law limits the claim of private protectible property to the adornments and
embellishments, great or small, that the individual gives to his share of the common property; the
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reflected in the concern courts seemed to have that the rules of conduct in the field
individual's "form and manner of expression" or his "development" or "treatment." It denies such
claim to the relationships ("situations" or "concepts"); or to the results human experience shows ordi-
narily will or may occur from such relationships ("dramatic cores," "themes," "skeleton plots," "scenes
a faire," "necessary or routine incidents"). It denies such claim to background, locale, or historic facts
either in or out ofjuxtaposition with other unprotectible elements. And since man is man regardless of
the particular experiences to which he is subjected, it should and probably does deny any property
right in any "character" apart from any particular series of events in which he acts.
These elements may be encompassed by the general word "ideas," for lack of more accurate term.
They are denied protectibility because of their universality; they are the raw materials with which
creative imaginations must work, and under no circumstances can they in and of themselves become
the private property of any individual.
There are many differences in terminology and each case presents individual facts. Nevertheless, a
study of the opinions leads one to the clear conclusion that in general the courts appreciate the vital
importance of preventing this public commons from being fenced in by any private individual, and
have recognized its scope and extent.
Carman, The Function of the Judge andJury in the "Literagy Property" Lawsuit, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 57-59
(1954), cited with approval in Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal.2d 715, 727 n.5, 299 P.2d 257, 262 n.5 (1956).
For additional direct comments of importance, see especially Note, Copyright Law Revision and the
Kewanee Preemption Issue: Is There a Doctrine in the House?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Copyright Law Revision]. See generally Sims, Right of Publicity." Survivability Reconsidered, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 480 (1981); Brenner, supra note 2, at 44; Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State
Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 927 (1974); Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate:
From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873 (1971), cited in Note, Copyright Law Revision, supra; Nathan, Unfair
Competition in Intellectual Products in the Public Domain, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 92 (1969); Comment, Copynght
Preemption and Character Values.- The Paladin Case as an Extension of Sears and Compco, 66 MICH. L. REV.
1018, 1037-39 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Copyright Preemption and Character Values]; Krasilovsky,
Observations on Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 205 (1966); Cummings, Some Aspects of Trade
Secrets and Their Protection.- The Public Domain and the "UnifiedDescription"Requirement, 54 KY. L.J. 190 (1965);
Spiegel, Intellectual Productions. A Poli Orientation, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 500 (1963); Stern & Hoffman, Public
Injuy and the Pubhl Interest. SecondaryMeaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 935 (1962).
For works somewhat less immediate, but nonetheless useful in deriving a public domain theory, see N.
HENRY, COPYRIGHT/INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY/PUBLIC POLICY (1975, 1976)(a valuable two-part
examination of "the social, political, and economic impact of the new information technologies..."). By
no means an exegesis of the public domain, it is nonetheless useful for the perspective it offers on the
position of the "copyright user" and for the corresponding doubts it raises or expresses about the usefulness
of intellectual property. See, e.g., I id at 54-57, 2 id at 144; COPYRIGHT: CURRENT VIEWPOINTS ON
HISTORY, LAWS, LEGISLATION (A. KENT & H. LANCOUR eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as A. KENT & H.
LANCOUR] (a collection of essays, some of them useful in defining the public domain from a user's point of
view); L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968)(an essential work on the historical
underpinnings of copyright; also develops a theoretical history that could be used in defining the public
domain, id. at 215-21; see note 137 infa); B. KAPLAN, supra note I (does not address the public domain
directly, but written from a "low protectionist bias ... with a concern for easy public access to, and use
and improvement of products of the mind," id at 125, thus, a valuable research source for anyone inter-
ested in assessing the scope of the public domain); J. MARKE, COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(1967) (a pamphlet prepared under the auspices of the Fund for the Advancement of Education; deals with
the question of public domain status for government-assisted research as well as with problems in informa-
tion retrieval and photocopying; does not develop a general theory); J. WHICHER, supra note 5 (an idiosyn-
cratic work, not readily summarized, taking the view in passing that the public domain is an essentially
empty concept conferring no "vested" or "affirmative" rights at all, see id at 203 ; still a useful work,
particularly in the insights suggested into the history of intellectual property theory and philosophy); S.
LADAS, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY (1938)(a dated but still
useful two-volume work; contains two sections on "lawful borrowing" and "indirect appropriations" that
shed indirect light on the public domain but do not deal with the subject in its own terms, see id. at 530-75;
in addition, fragmentary recognition of the public domain is extended in the context of a discussion of the
1909 Act); Jaszi, supra note 17 (an important article, equally impressive in both scholarly and practical
insights, treating the subject of derivative works theory in motion picture production from a perspective
consistent with a more general concern for the public domain); Nevins, supra note 3 (critical of conven-
tional derivative works theory as it applies to derivative works which have fallen into the public domain;
does not develop a general public domain theory and, indeed, observes that "the concept of the public
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of intellectual property not favor one contender unwisely, unfairly, or adventi-
tiously-in the last case, that is to say, merely because that contender happened to
have been the first to come forward with a claim. 2' Then, coinciding roughly with
the appearance of the trial court's opinion in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Company,
Inc. 22 in 1972, the law seemed suddenly to metastasize. Since then, I would argue,
it has developed too rapidly and in too many ill-defined directions, with the conse-
quence that in numerous instances exclusive rights have been recognized in con-
tenders who simply have not demonstrated a legitimate claim. 23 The opinion in
Lugosi was an event in its own day. It is still worth recalling despite its familiarity
domain needs very little elucidation ... ," id. at 59); Patterson, supra note 3 (useful for its insight into the
evolution of copyright-and, by implication, other forms of intellectual property law-from its origins in
natural law theory to new roots in legal positivism; the effect of this shift is to introduce substantial new
threats to free expression); Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright.. A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Liebig, Style and Performance, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
40 (1969) (arguing against recognition of separate protection for "style" and "performance" from a perspec-
tive essentially consistent with a large public domain theory); Treece, Copying Methods ofProduct Dijerentia-
ion: Fair or Unfair Competition, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 244 (1962)(developing an argument analogous to
public domain theory).
For selected readings in the literature on the first amendment of value in deriving a public domain
theory, see generally, Kulzick & Hogue, Chilled Bird- Freedom of Expression in the Eighties, 14 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 57 (1980); Patterson, supra note 3; Goldstein, supra note 19; Nimmer, Copyright v. the First Amendment,
17 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 255 (1970).
And, finally, for works expressing reservations or doubts of some consequence in deriving a public
domain theory, see Comment, The Right of Publicty. Premature Burialfor California Property Rights in the Wake of
Lugosi, 12 PAC. L. J. 987, 995-96 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Premature Burial]; Note, The Right of
Publicity-Protectonfor Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 549 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Right of ubhity]; Derenberg, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1192,
1213 (1964); Handler, Product Simulation.: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1183, 1188-91 (1964).
21. See Carman, supra note 20, at 58-59. Professor Kaplan expressed similar confidence in the
common law processes. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 77. Cf. Derenberg, supra note 19.
22. 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (1972), rev'd, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), aJ'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813,
603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
23. I mark this metastasis from the appearance of Lugosi. Another more comprehensive frame of
reference may be seen as having begun with the appearance of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) and Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), followed by Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) and Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974)-the latter two cases, of course, coinciding almost exactly with the trial
court opinion in Lugosi. Perhaps the movements in intellectual property which I find troubling and which
are the occasion for this essay need to be understood as originating in the currents of opinion which have
followed in the wake of all of these cases. Compare, e.g., Note, Intellectual Property--Performer's Style-A Quest
for Ascertainment, Recognition and Protection, 52 DEN. L. J. 561, 578-80 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Per-
former's Style]. And it was no doubt of particular significance that Sears-Compco and the later cases gave such
a boost to misappropriation theory just as the publicity field itself was about to explode. Cf Brown, Elegiac
Reflections, supra note 20, at 1041-43; Note, The "Copying-Mirappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in the
Development of the Sears-Compco Preemption Doctrinhe, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1458-73 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Copyihg Misappropriation]. See also Nathan, supra note 20. On the impact of Sears-Compco, see
generally Symposium, Product Simulation. A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1178, cited (with amused
appreciation) in B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 94. See also Nathan, supra note 20. On the impact of Lear, see
generally Goldstein, supra note 20. On the impact of Goldstein, see generall Brown, Elegiac Reflections, supra
note 20. On the impact of Kewanee, see generally Stem, supra note 20. For a brief, practical summary of the
movement from Sears-Compco through Kewanee , see generally Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrihe Today: Trade-
marks and Unfair Competitien, 67 TRADE-MARK REP. 132 (1977).
An important advantage of appreciating the signal influence of these additional cases is that some of
the difficulties that otherwise attend an effort to characterize as "new" the overlapping jurisdictions of
trademark-unfair competition-copyright (which are not in fact new phenomenon at all) are thereby
alleviated: one is permitted to understand that some old problems have taken on new significance in a
period of expanding intellectual property litigation.
Page 147: Autumn 19811
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
and its subsequent reversal. Bela Lugosi's widow and son had brought suit to
enjoin Universal Pictures from exploiting the deceased actor's likeness. Their con-
tention was that in licensing commercial representations of the character Dracula,
made to resemble Bela Lugosi as he had portrayed that character in movies, Uni-
versal was appropriating an important right which had belonged to Lugosi during
his lifetime and which, as part of his estate, had devolved on the plaintiffs them-
selves upon his death. As all students of intellectual property know, the trial court
upheld that claim. 24
The decision clearly was important in its own terms. Prior to i970 the writing
in the field of publicity had been relatively sparse. There were some very good
works, beginning with an article by Melville Nimmer which appeared in this
journal. 25 The gist of the literature was that there ought to be an alternative to the
fourth branch of privacy-the appropriation of personality branch identified by
Dean Prosser 26 -- that would permit its possessor to exploit his own personality
more efficiently than was possible under prevailing doctrines, particularly as they
applied to such personal interests as the older right of privacy. 27 But not all of the
earlier writers had addressed the prospect which Lugosi faced squarely: that if the
right of publicity was to be a new species of property it could in theory devolve
and descend forever. 28 This central point, made compellingly clear by the trial
court's decision in Lugosi , led to a profusion of writing about the expanding field of
publicity which at times since has seemed almost frenzied.2 9
24. "It is this court's holding that Bela Lugosi's interest or right in his likeness and appearance as
Count Dracula was a property right of such character and substance that it did not terminate with his
death but descended to his heirs." Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. 541, 551 (1972), rev'd,
70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), aft'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979).
25. Nimmer, The Right of Publhcity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
26. See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 401-07 (1960).
27. A number of writers prior to Lugosi suggested a property right in publicity. E.g., Comment, Com-
mercial Appropriation of an Individual's Name, Photograph, or Likeness: A New Remedy for Californians, 3 PAC. L.J.
651 (1972); Donenfeld, Property or Other Rights in the Names, Likenesses, or Personalities of Deceased Persons, 16
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'v 17 (1968); Note, Right ofPrtvacy---Property Rights, 11 N.Y.L.F. 120 (1965); Gordon,
Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and Histog, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553 (1960); Note, Hogan v. A. S
Barnes & Co., 31 TEMP. L. Q. 224 (1958); Nimmer, supra note 25.
Few pre-Lugosi writers were opposed to the recognition of publicity rights. But see Liebig, Style and
Performance, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 40 (1969).
28. Some writers who had suggested a property right in publicity had also argued for descendibility.
Eg., Comment, supra note 27; Donenfeld, supra note 27; Gordon, supra note 27.
And others had approved of descendibility even without recognizing publicity as a property right. Eg.,
Note, The Right to Privacy in the Name, Reputation, and Personality of a Deceased Relative, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW.
324 (1965); Note, Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 48 CORNELL L. Q. 360 (1962).
Of course, the equation between property states and descendibility has been noted frequently since
Lugosi. Eg., Note, The Right of Publicity, supra note 20, at 545 (noted approvingly), quoted with substantial
reservations in Hoffman, supra note 20, at 134 n.122, 134-35.
29. Most of the post-Lugosi writing on the right of publicity has approved of (or accepted) its
descendibility. Eg., Comment, Assessment of the Copyright Model in Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
786 (1982); Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Doornail on Descendibility in California, 13 U.W.L.A. L. REV.
203 (1981); Phillips, A Haystack in a Hurricane. Divergent Case Law on the Right of Publicity and the Copyright Act
of 1976, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 296 (1981); Comment, Premature Burial, supra note 20; Saret & Stern, Publicity
and Privacy-Distinct Interests on the Misappropriation Continuum, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 675 (1981); Winner,
Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protectionfor a Trademark's "Persona," 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 193 (1981);Sims, supra note 20; Lazar, Towards a Right of Biography. Controllig Commercial Exploitation of Personal History,
2 COM./ENT. L. J. 489 (1980); Pilpel, Right of Publicity, 27 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 249 (1980); Note,
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The nature of the right, its scope and the question of "descendibility" (as it has
come to be called) continue to be subjects for debate. 30 But Lugosi's impact has
been wider than that. The opinion seemed to encourage a general interest in new
Descendhlity ofthe Right of Publicity, 14 GA. L. REV. 831 (1980); Note, Descendibility of Celebnty's Right to
Benefitfrom Fame, 47 TENN. L. REV. 886 (1980); Note, Inhentability of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death of the
Famous, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1251 (1980); Brenner, supra note 2; Note, Lugosiv. Universal Pitures Descent ofthe
Right of Pubicity, 29 HASTINGS L. J. 751 (1978); Note, Community Property Interests in the Right of aPublicity, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1095 (1978); Comment, The Tort of Misappropriation of Aame or Likeness under Wisconsin's
New Prta Law, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 1029; Comment, lrvaq, Appropriation, and the First Amendment. A Human
Cannonball's Rather Rough Landing, 1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 579; Comment, Appropriation of a Performer's Act by the
News Meda. Is it Priileged?, 16 WASHBURN L. J. 786 (1977); Note, Performer's Right of Pubcity: A Limitation
on News Prtvilege, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 587 (1977); Note, The Right of ublicity, supra note 20; Comment,
Transfer of the Right ofblcity.• Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1103 (1975);
Sobel, Count Dracula and the Right of Pubcity, 47 L.A. BAR BULL. 373 (1972).
Some writers have tried to reconcile the California and New York positions by placing Lugosi under the
exception for publicity rights not exploited before death. They would approve of descendibility if the right
were exercised during the possessor's lifetime. Eg., Phillips, supra; Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures:
Doornail on Descendibility in California, supra.
Still others would approve of descendibility if a contract for the exploitation of the possessor's publicity
right was in existence before his death. Eg., Felcher & Rubin, Descendibility of the Right ofPublicity: Is There
Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Felcher & Rubin, Descendibility];
Felcher & Rubin, Priacy, Pubiity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L. J. 1577 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Felcher & Rubin, Real People].
A few articles have disapproved of descendibility. E.g., Note, Pubhiy as an Aspect of Prvacy and PersonalAutonomy, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Personalutonomy]; Hoffman, supra note
20.
And a few have discussed the right of publicity without consideration of its descendibility. Eg., Note,
Entertainment Law--An Injunction Restricting an Actor's Right of Publcity and First Amendment Rights Is Against
Public Policy, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845 (1981); Note, First Amendment Theog Applied to the Right of
Publicity, 19 B.C.L. REV. 277 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, First Amendment Theory]; Note, Performer's
Style, supra note 23; Treece, Commercial Exploitation oNames, Likenesses, and Personal Hzistories, 51 TEX. L. REV.
637 (1973).
30. The courts, of course, are having the last word, although lines of authority diverge even within the
same jurisdiction. Numerous decisions have suggested or expressly recognized that the right to publicity is
a species of property. Eg. , Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981); Groucho
Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982); Winterland Concessions Co. v.
Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. 11. 1981); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Pub., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Martin Luther King, Jr. v. American
Heritage, 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981); First Victoria Nat'l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096 (5th
Cir. 1980); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 498 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Gee v. CBS, 471
F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Penn. 1979); Hirsch v. Johnson & Son, 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979); Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 455 F.
Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Universal City Studios v. Ideal, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q.
761 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 260, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d
Dept. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,
367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Cepeda v.
Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966);
Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Penn. 1963); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad-
casting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
Others have recognized the right of publicity but have not defined it as a property right. Eg., Rock
Tours, Ltd. v. Does, 507 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ala. 1981); National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee, 503 F.
Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Ann-Margaret v. High Society Magazine, 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Mot-
schenbacher v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974); Boothe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362
F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Current Audio v. RCA, 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1972);
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causes of action so that, although the right of publicity itself may well be moving
toward greater restraints, 31 in the field of intellectual property at large there now
appear to be more candidates for protection than one can safely categorize. 32
Much of the writing and many of the cases have defended this profusion on the
ground of exigent economic necessity. The interests newly advanced are valuable,
we are told, and therefore deserve protection. 33 But to one who is unimpressed by
this explanation-who sees it, indeed, as a massive exercise in question-begging-
the field of intellectual property can begin to resemble a game of conceptual Pac
Man in which everything in sight is being gobbled up.34
The fact that the 1909 Copyright Act still was undergoing a general revision in
the same decade in which Lugosi appeared also must be credited with having given
impetus to the new activity. The 1909 Act clearly needed revising and the revi-
sions it got seem, in the main, to have been sensible ones.35 Yet the 1976 Act itself
reflects some of the new rapaciousness. The copyright term has been increased by
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1968); Palmer v.
Schonhorn, 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1968).
Meanwhile, some decisions recognize descendibility if the right to publicity is exercised before the pos-
sesser's death. Eg., Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Pub., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Martin Luther King, Jr. v.
American Heritage, 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Commerce Union Bank v. Coors, 7 Med. L. Rptr.
2204 (No. 81-1252-Il, Tenn. Ch., Oct. 2, 1981); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Others recognize descendibility regardless of pre-death exercise. E.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339 (D.NJ. 1981); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d. 661
(2d Dept. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
And some cases have rejected descendibility. E.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d
Cir. 1981)(following Tennessee law), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982)(Factors I1); Frosch v. Grossett &
Dunlap, 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (2d Dept. 1980); Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors
Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod.,
25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 813,
603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
Factors !! rejected descendibility following Tennessee law as interpreted by the Sixth Circuit in Memphis
Development Foundation, which noted that, "Tennessee courts have not addressed this issue directly or indi-
rectly, and we have no way to assess their predisposition." 616 F.2d at 958. But when a Tennessee court
finally did speak last year, it was to uphold descendibility. Commerce Union Bank v. Coors, 7 Med. L.
Rptr. 2204 (No. 81-1252-III, Tenn. Ch., Oct. 2, 1981). The Southern District of New York to which Factors
II was remanded for entry of judgment has since granted a stay pending plaintiffs petition to the Second
Circuit to rehear the case in light of Commerce Union Bank. No. 77 Civ. 4704, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. May 11,
1982).
31. The California Supreme Court's decision in Lugosi has restored some sense of perspective in this
field. Meanwhile, law review writers are beginning to suggest that publicity rights need to be taken in
hand. See, e.g., Shipley, Pubhio Never Dies; It just Fades Away. The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 673 (1981); Hoffman, supra note 20. See also Felcher & Rubin, Real People, supra note 29,
at 1619.
32. Cf Brown, Elegiac Reflections, supra note 20, at 1044-45 (commenting on the emergence of new
theories inspired by Goldstein v. Califrnia).
33. See, e.g., Lazar, supra note 29, at 523-43. See also Winner, supra note 29; Note, The Right of Publicity
as a Means of Proteaig Performers' Style, 14 LoY.L.A. L. REV. 129 (1980).
34. Cf Goswell, The Viewpoint of the Librarian and Library User in A. KENT & H. LANCOUR, supra note
20, at 63 ("One member of a self-appointed committee of copyright lawyers has boasted that they have
developed restrictions on every means of transmission of thought except smell, taste, and extrasensory
perception"). But see Rosen, Current Trends in Entertainment Litigation: The Insurance Empire Strikes Back, 1
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW. 1 (1982)(suggesting that the defenses against overreaching literary prop-
erty claims are becoming tougher and more frequently successful).
35. See geerall Symposium. The Copyright Act of 1976, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951 (1977).
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approximately 50 percent. 36 And much of common law copyright is now the sub-
ject of federal law.3 7 Indeed, the reach of the new Act can seem ludicrous: notes to
babysitters, instructions to chimney sweeps, directions to my house-all of these
almost certainly meet the minimal standards of creativity required by the law of
copyright and, assuming that they are recorded in some tangible medium of
expression (such as pencil on paper), can command statutory copyright without
any other affirmative act whatsoever. 38 I suspect this would impress most lay per-
sons learning of it for the first time as unimaginably foolish. At the least, it reflects
what I (and a number of others) think to be the generally debatable reach of even
as well-thought-through an area of law as copyright.3 9
But statutory copyright probably is not the most important source of problems
in the intellectual property field just now. With its doubtful premises and its con-
ceptual perplexities, the law of copyright nonetheless reflects a substantial and
fairly satisfactory set of accords. The problem of marking off boundaries has been
addressed in the requirement of tangibility40 and also in the elaborate provisions
for notice as well as deposit and registration. 4 1 Copying must be substantial before
it is actionable;4 2 and the law at least approaches, if it does not wholly succeed in
resolving, the troublesome possibilities of legitimate multiple claims in a work. 43
In short, copyright seems to be in a state of reasonable equilibrium, 44 and though I
confess to substantially less familiarity with patent law, I think that much the same
assessment probably can be made of that field as well. 45 The principal problems in
36. The comparison drawn here is between the 56-year term available under the 1909 Act and the
assumption by the draftsmen of the General Revision that the 1976 Act would probably provide an
average term amounting to 75 years. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 9.01[A], at 9-10. Compare the
more substantial criticism of the (then pending) term in Breyer, supra note 20, at 323-29. See also B.
KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 111-17. Cf Patterson, Copyright and The Pub/ic Interest in A. KENT & H. LANCOUR,
supra note 20, at 47 ("As copyright law has developed in this country .. .the monopoly of copyright has
continually increased. . . the public interest has continually receded into the background as the copyright
industry has become more and more powerful").
37. See generaly Brown, Uniftation, supra note 20.
38. Compare the similar list in Brown, Uniftcatzon, supra note 20, at 1079. My point here is subject to
attack on two grounds: first, that the 1976 Act is merely picking up interests that probably would have
been covered by common law copyright anyway; and second, that even the longer term of the new Act is
shorter than forever (that is to say, shorter than the term of the common law right). See, e.g., B. KAPLAN,
supra note 1, at 116; Brown, Unzftatzn, supra note 20, at 1079-80. But, as is frequently noted, statutory
copyright protection clearly is more valuable than common law protection and, in any event, the more
important point is that "junk interests" like these probably should not be protected as property at all. See
id at 1097-98. But cf id. at 1079 n.53.
39. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 114-17. See genera4l id. at 78-125. See also Brown, Unifwation, supra
note 20. Cf Breyer, supra note 20, at 323-29.
40. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
41. Cf Levine & Squires, Notz'e, Deposit and Registraton. The Importance of Being Formal, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1232, 1232-36 (1977). See generally 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, §§ 7.02-.15 (as to notice), §§ 7.16-.21
(as to registration and deposit).
42. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 13.03[A], at 13-16, 13-30 to -35.
43. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
44. An equilibrium, at least, in basic theory; many questions remain unresolved. See, e.g., Ringer, The
Unfimshed Bustiness of Copyright Revision, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951 (1977).
45. See Bowes, Patents and the Publc Interest, 61 A.B.A.J. 1521 (1975). See generaly PRESIDENT's COM-
MISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS" 2 (1966)
("Agreeing that the patent system has in the past performed well its Constitutional mandate 'to promote
the progress of. . .useful arts,' the Commission asked itself: What is the basic worth of a patent system in
the context of present day conditions? The members of the Commission unanimously agreed that a patent
Page 147: Autumn 1981]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
intellectual property law are to be found instead in a host of other, less well-
worked-out, property-equivalent theories which are appearing in sporadic, ad hoc
fashion in the literature and, what is more important, in state and federal courts
across the country. I have already observed that it is probably impossible to iden-
tify all of these theories; in any event, exhaustive categorization and doctrinal
analysis are foreign to my purpose. In this essay, I intend rather to record the
insistent impression I have that certain claims, essentially new, have begun to
appear in disparate settings and have not yet been met with an adequate concern
for the encroachments they are making into the public domain. 46
Three recent cases will suffice as examples of my point. One of these, the most
recent of the Marx brothers cases, 4 7 illustrates, as I shall show, how publicity
theory can go wrong when courts are too quick to pass by the basic issues
presented in this field of law. The second case, 48 which involves litigation initiated
by the proprietors of the character Superman to prevent the students at Chicago's
Daley College from naming their campus newspaper The Daley Planet, is an
example of how the law of trademarks-which, like copyrights and patents, is at
least susceptible to confinement within reasonable limits49-has begun to spill over
its boundaries and encroach into territories in which trademark protection
system today is capable of continuing to provide an incentive to research, development, and innovation.
They have discovered no practical substitute for the unique service it renders."). But see Topol, Patents and
Hunting Licenses-Some Iconoclastic Comments and an Irreverent Solution, 17 AM. U. L. REV. 424 (1968).
46. I persist throughout this essay in describing the current assaults upon the public domain as
"new"-and in terms of their frequency and the relentless inventiveness of the writers, lawyers and clients
who are mounting them I think I am essentially correct. Still, an author's conceit can be treacherous and I
have tried to be sensitive to earlier expressions of similar concern.
One such expression (similar though less strident) was recorded by Professor Kaplan shortly after the
decisions in Sears and Compco, and was offered in the context of observations on the need for copyright
reform:
My discussion has been abstruse, but it comes down to this. A hugger-mugger over the concept of
"publication" beginning a half-century ago has generated interesting possibilities of evading the con-
trols of the Copyright Act even as to subject matter plainly within its reach. False classification of a
copyright problem as being something different from that can have the same effect of evasion. As to
subject matter not admitted to copyright by the present act, we have a turbulent condition of the law.
And over the scene sound the oracular words of the Supreme Court, which must chill the blood of any
dues-paying Manichaean.
B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 96. See genera ly id. at 83-99. Professor Kaplan was at pains, however, to deny
any "[suggestion] that the law is undergoing a general, wicked deterioration," id. at 77. See a/so id. note 21,
supra. He appeared to believe that changes in the Copyright Act would "respond reasonably .. .to the
current problems both legal and practical." Id. at 97.
The "Manichaean heresy" implicated in what even Professor Kaplan described as the "aberrant drive
toward irregular protection," id at 97, was a metaphor suggested still earlier by Professor Brown. See
Brown, Product Simulation, supra note 20, at 1227. In general, as I have noted, Professor Brown has been
especially persistent in calling attention to threats to the public domain. See note 20 supra, notes 111-36
and accompanying text infa.
Other warnings also have been sounded. See generally Shipley, supra note 31; Hoffman, supra note 20;
Laff & Saret, Further Unraveling of Sears-Compco: Of Patches, Paladin and Laurel & Hardy, 7 Loy. U. CHI. L.
J. 33, 55-56 (1976)("The law of intellectual property has been undergoing an eccentric reconceptualization
in recent years"); Liebig, supra note 27, at 42; Krasilovsky, supra note 20.
47. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
48. DC Comics, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, No. 81 C 2402 (N.D. Ill., filed June 17, 1981).
49. For a useful recent treatment of this subject matter, see generally McClure, Trademarks and Unfair
Competition.- A Critical HIztoiy of Legal Thought, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 305 (1979).
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amounts to trespass. And the third case,50 perhaps the most striking of the three,
has resulted in a preliminary injunction which prevents the United States Marine
Corps League from drawing any prominent connection between its "Semper
Fidelis Band Award," given annually to high school students, and John Philip
Sousa, the celebrated conductor of the Marine Corps Band, whose stirring march
Semper Fideh's was composed in 1888 during his service to the Corps from whose
own motto he had taken the title to his work verbatim. Against the vigorous appeal
of this passage from American history, the injunction reflects the law's delicate
concern for the exclusive rights to Sousa's name and likeness, claimed, since 1973,
by a high school band magazine headquartered in Evanston, Illinois. Together,
these three cases suggest something of the current thrust of the law into once-
uncharted fields.
Consider, first, Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and Niht Co., Inc. ,'51 decided
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
plaintiffs claimed standing as successors to rights in the names and likenesses of
Groucho, Chico and Harpo Marx, deceased. The defendants were the production
company of the Broadway play A Day in Ho/ywood, A Niht tn the Ukraine and its
producers, as well as the authors of the play who were brought into the litigation
as third party defendants. The circumstances were these: the authors, wishing to
create a "spoof" on the excesses of Hollywood and Hollywood movies in the thir-
ties, wrote a play in which they used the Marx Brothers as characters. The play
was produced in England where it enjoyed a substantial success, and then was
brought to New York where it met similar enthusiasm. 52 The plaintiffs claimed
that in the appropriation of the Marx Brothers characters the defendants had
taken or violated several of the plaintiffs' own interests, one of them the right of
publicity. On the basis of an examination of New York law-a body of law which
exists mainly in the form of hypothesis by the Second Circuit 53-the district court
agreed with the plaintiffs. The court rejected the authors' claim of a first amend-
ment privilege on the ground that although they had added "a new situation with
original lines," still, as to the Marx Brothers, they had succeeded only in creating
50. Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
51. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y 1981).
52. 'A Day in Hollywood,' a British import about the heyday of Hollywood musicals and comedies,
has ingratiating performances. . . . The first half of the evening is a comic tribute to movie musicals
and the second half is a slap-happy send up of Chekhov's short play, "The Bear," as performed by
three newly invented stand-ins for the Marx Brothers.
Gussow, Three Musicals, Three 'Stars,' N.Y. Times, May 11, 1980, § 2, at 7, col. 3.
53. Federal courts have recognized a right of publicity in New York decisional and statutory law. See
Lerman v. Chuckleberry Pub. Co., 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ann-Margaret v. High Society Mag.,
498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc.
v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Universal City Studios v. Ideal, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q.
761 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816,
(1953).
The right survives, at least if exploited during the possessor's lifetime. See Groucho Marx Productions,
Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 440 U.S 908 (1979), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying Tennessee law),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982),iugment stayed, No. 77 Civ. 4704, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1982).
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an imitative work lacking in "significant value as pure entertainment" and there-
fore exceeding the boundaries of first amendment protection. 54 Commenting on
this aspect of the court's opinion, an editorial writer in Fortune had the following to
say:
The "Ukraine" part, for those who missed this dichotomous production, was an inspired
romp in which playwright Richard Vosburgh fancifully imagined how the Marx Brothers
would have interpreted Chekhov's play The Bear .... [D]oes it really make sense to say
that a conception as starkly original as [this] . .. is just an "imitation" of the Marx
Brothers? Well .. .[the district court] is indeed saying that (while adding the self-under-
mining qualification that the imitation comes "in a new situation with new lines"). In the
immortal words of Rufus T. Firefly, the Groucho character in Duck Soup: "A four-year-old
child could understand this . . . . Run out and find me a four-year-old child."' 5 5
I am frankly critical of the conclusions reached in this opinion almost without
exception. But the mistakes are not entirely of the trial judge's making. In the
main, the opinion appears to be an earnest restatement of the law. The real fault
is in the law itself and, if we are to see why, we must ask questions that go some-
what deeper into the case than does the opinion.
What we need to ask is why a property right of any kind ought to be recog-
nized in characters like the ones created by the Marx Brothers. If we were to reply
in terms of copyright law the answer to this question would seem reasonably
clear. 56 But what is the basis for a claim of additional interests? I think the answer
to that question is still far from clear. It is sometimes said that the right of pub-
licity rests on the commercial value of the interest itself,57 but that explanation is
nonsense without something more. A claim of this sort will have commercial value
only if it also has the protection of the law. In a sense, the value of this property
stems from the fact that the law recognizes it and protects it.58 Perhaps the ques-
tion to be considered, then, is really two questions: first, whether there is a sensible
basis upon which a claim can be made to rest beyond the value which protection
undoubtedly will confer, and second, whether there is any offsetting consideration
which might lead one to conclude that protection ought not be granted even
though there is some legitimacy in the claim. 59 I think that on both of these con-
siderations the right of publicity as we see it in a case like Day and Night fails to
justify itself by a wide margin.
First, as to the basis for protection, we might simply wish to recognize an orig-
54. 523 F. Supp at 492-94.
55. Seligman, Keeping Up, FORTUNE, Nov. 16, 1981, at 50.
56. The rationale for recognizing copyright is typically expressed in terms of a barter transaction in
which the author's efforts are encouraged by the prospect of a limited monopoly; ultimately the public
benefits from incremental additions to the public domain. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, §§ 1.03[A],
1.05[D], 4.03. f Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). (Of course I do not mean to address the quite
separate problem of recognizing characters in copyright generated by the so-called Sam Spade doctrine. See
generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.12, at 2-171 to -172.)
57. Eg., Gordon, supra note 27, at 555-57; Comment, Premature Burial, supra note 20, at 995-97.
58. As has been suggested before, e.g., Bloustein, Prnacy Is Dear At Any Prie. A Response to Professor
Posner's Economic Analysis, 12 GA. L. REv. 429, 448 (1978); Comment, Copyright Preemption and Character
Values, supra note 20, at 1027.
59. Questions like these are beginning to appear in the literature with some frequency. See Hoffman,
supra note 20, at 116-33. See also Note, Personal Autonomy, supra note 29, at 729-51; Felcher & Rubin,
Deseendibility, supra note 29, at 1128.
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inal creation and acknowledge its value-that is, its value to its creator, measured
in terms of some personal investment in invention, and its value to the public,
which can sensibly prize any true creation. 60 Then, no matter where the line
finally is to be drawn as to the term of a claim-whether at the death of the cre-
ator or some time later-at least after death the value of the invention ought to be
assessed more insistently in terms of some demonstrated creativity, since by that
time the more personal aspects of the undertaking presumably will matter less
insistently to the creator.6' This seems to me to be a shifting equation of some
obviousness, but also of some considerable inportance. Yet one of the most trou-
blesome aspects of the publicity cases is that they have so frequently been brought
on by persons other than the actual creators of the interests advanced. The Day and
Niht case is a good example of what I mean. The plaintiffs in this case are not the
Marx Brothers themselves, but rather their legal successors, so that we do not see
in the plaintiffs any direct, personal entitlement to protection. Such claims as they
may have rest entirely in the remnant position of their predecessors. 62 This is just
the point at which we ought to take a more demanding look at what their prede-
cessors have left us. Unfortunately, however, when we examine the record of the
Marx Brothers, it is difficult-as it is in most cases impossible, given the very dif-
ferent perspective of the law in earlier times-to distinguish what they invented
from what they converted. The dimensions of their bequests are unclear. The
result is that we cannot sensibly judge what portions of their successors' claims to
accept.
That the characters were successful in one sense is clear and that they were the
products of some creative invention seems probable as well: the Marx Brothers are
commonly thought to have been as creative a group as any to emerge from Amer-
ican vaudeville. But what we cannot know in fact, and what I suspect strongly
could not be proven now if one set out to do so with the best will in the world, is
how much the characters created by the Marx Brothers owe to the work of tens,
scores, perhaps hundreds of other vaudeville and burlesque performers with whom
they came into contact during their early years in the business. What we do not
know, in short, is how much of these characters the Marx Brothers themselves
appropriated from others. All that is certain is that they created themselves, indi-
vidually and collectively, as a kind of living derivative work. That much Groucho
himself has told us, 63 but even without his candid admissions, it would be foolish
60. Compare, for example, the suggestions in Note, Personal Autonomy, supra note 29, at 730; Felcher &
Rubin, Descendihibiy, supra note 29, at 1128; Hoffman, supra note 20, at 116-18; Comment,An Artzt's Personal
Rights in His Creatte Works, 9 PAc. L. J. 855, 888 (1978); Comment, Copyright Preenption and Character Values,
supra note 20, at 1034-36. Cf Carman, supra note 20, at 60-61; Krasilovsky, supra note 20, at 215; Speigel,
supra note 20, at 503-04; Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976 Case of Droit de Suite, 47
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 217 (1976). See also L. PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 215-21; Whicher, The Ghost
of Donaldson v. Becket (pts. I & 2), 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 102, 124-25, 194, 219-22 (1962).
61. See Note, PersonalAutonomy, supra note 29, at 753 n. 149; Hoffman, supra note 20, at 135-39; Felcher
& Rubin, Real People, supra note 29, at 1618-19; cf. Nevins, supra note 20, at 72; Goldstein, supra note 19, at
1016. But cf. Sims, supra note 20, at 472-81.
62. Cf Hoffman, supra note 20, at 136 ("[I]f defendants in publicity cases are accused of unjust enrich-
ment,.the accusation might be hurled with equal vigor at the heirs of a celebrity. It is the celebrity, not his
heirs, whose labors created the publicity value").
63. I believe all comedians arrive by trial and error. This was certainly true in the old days of
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and indeed ignorant of the history of burlesque and vaudeville to doubt that they
took what they wanted from what they observed among the performers they grew
up with, perhaps adding in the process important new material of their own. 64 To
be sure, the Marx Brothers became celebrities as most vaudevillians did not. But
surely we are not rewarding them on that ground alone. Even in an age as celeb-
rity-haunted as this, we cannot mean to establish dynasties on the memory of
fame.65 Our acknowledgement must be rooted in some legitimate perception of
vaudeville, and I'm sure it's true today. The average team would consist of a straight man and a
comic. The straight man would sing, dance or possibly do both. And the comedian would steal a few
jokes from other acts and find a few in the newspapers and comic magazines. They would then
proceed to play small-time vaudeville theatres, burlesque shows, night clubs and beer gardens. If the
comic was inventive, he would gradually discard the stolen jokes and the ones that died and try out
some of his own. In time, if he was any good, he would emerge from the routine character he had
started with and evolve into a distinct personality of his own. This has been my experience and also
that of my brothers, and I believe this has been true of most of the other comedians.
G. MARX, GROUCHO AND ME 88 (1959).
Of course, what Groucho is saying in this passage is that although he and his brothers began as bor-
rowers they ended as inventors. That may be true but if it is, we want more proof of it than is in the Day
andNight case. The point here is that we-and not the artist or his heirs-must be the ones to judge how
much of the borrowed has been discarded in favor of the invented. If the invented is merely a compilation
of discrete public domain elements (Groucho's "moustache, cigar, slouch, and leer," for example; see Day
and Night, 523 F. Supp. at 491) bound together by the now-disintegrating fabric of a man's one-time
personality, it may make no sense at all to protect it as an abstraction after his death-which is essentially
the point made by the authorities in note 61 supra; and if, indeed, the effect of extending protection would
be to preclude his reincarnated self from starting over, as seems likely, then the result truly becomes as
perverse as the contemplation of it. For the central lesson in the passage from Groucho's book is that the
process of creativity inevitably begins in borrowing. Compare Liebig, supra note 27, at 46-47 (quoted at
note 129 infra). It is a central failing in the contemporary intellectual property literature and case law that
that lesson, so widely acknowledged, is so imperfectly understood. Indeed, the absolute necessity of the
trial-and-error process often seems to escape those proponents of new rights who appear to understand the
process well. Compare e.g., Note, Performer's Style, supra note 23, at 591-94.
64. It is not churlish to demand proof of invention. Theft of material, though disapproved of, was
endemic among vaudevillians:
In his quest for material the vaudevillian too often stepped on his fellow artist, causing bitterness
among the performers. Vanity observed in 1928 that not only was material being lifted, but many acts
credited the source of their piracy. Joe Laurie, Jr., believed that the stealing helped kill vaudeville
because eventually it seemed as though everyone was doing the same act. Comedy acts were the
easiest targets for piracy and for many years there was nothing that could be done. At any Palace
opening matinee many small-timers sat in the audience, on the prowl for fresh material. Small-time
bookers condoned lifting material from headliners, since it afforded their theaters topflight material.
Often an entire act was stolen. As Benny Rubin related, "Mel Klee did Al Herman, Marty May did
Jack Benny . . . Sid Marion did Jack Pearl [and] there were more."
J. DiMEcuo, VAUDEVILLE, U.S.A. 76 (1973).
Sometimes, those who denounced piracy in others were not above reproach themselves:
Ben Blue was once accosted by W. C. Fields, himself notorious for lifting lines, and was accused of
stealing a routine. Blue called Fields a liar and other performers finally convinced Fields that he had
originally stolen the material from Blue. In an open letter in Variety, Bert Lahr accused Joe E. Brown
of having stolen the Lahr character. Though Brown never replied, Sam Sidman, an old-time Dutch
comedian, did, angrily. He claimed Lahr had stolen the character from him and not only that, but
Sidman had stolen it from Sam Bernard. "I admit it, why don't you?" demanded Sidman of Lahr.
Id at 77.
I suspect that in some instances the taking was unintentional-a case, at worst, of unconscious plagia-
rism; in others, the taking (though intentional) may have been forgotten over the years, particularly as it
joined with others in the evolution of "derivative works"; in still other instances, there may have been no
taking at all: the conventions of vaudeville and the expectations of audiences must have produced frequent
similarity without deliberate theft. See generally id
In any event, as I have suggested, it is entirely fair to inquire into claims of originality or invention,
even among celebrities.
65. See Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc.,; Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir.
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merit. Fame is not inconsistent with merit but neither is it evidence of merit. And
if, as in the case of the Marx Brothers, we cannot judge the question of how much
of their success was rooted in the original merit of others, then how are we to
recognize the equity in their successors' claims? There is a failure of proof here: a
failure originally to mark off the boundaries of the claim; a failure now to establish
a right to title.
66
The second question we must raise is whether offsetting costs to society may
outweigh whatever equity there is in the claim. Again this is a question of some
subtlety,67 but we can begin by examining the position of the writers in the Day and
Nighl case. What they sought to do, by their own account, "was to write a satiric
comment on Hollywood movies using a parody of the Marx Brothers movies as
one of the literary devices."' 68 The work they produced earned substantial public
acceptance and, despite the court's opinion, has at least some claim to acceptance
as a creative success as well. 69 Yet the result of this litigation is that the work no
longer can be performed as written without accommodating the plaintiffs in some
fashion. In a case like this, then, what society loses is a right of access amounting
to an easement. In at least a preliminary sense, this is always the result of
upholding a claim to a right of publicity. Such disputes as there may be about this
cost can never amount to more than an attack on the value of the work; the loss
itself is a constant. We see this lesson in Day and A'ght in the trial judge's dismissal
of that work as imitative. But the decision whether society's loss should be borne
1980)(Merritt, J.)("Fame falls in the same category as reputation; it is an attribute from which others may
benefit but may not own"). See also Hoffman, supra note 20, at 114 ("[I1n our publicity-conscious society,
where anyone may achieve instant fame through media exposure, the large number of potential right of
publicity plaintiffs ...[suggests] that the scope of the right ought to be delineated with caution"). See also
id at 136-37. Butcf Sims, supra note 20, at 497; Brenner, supra note 2, at 46 ("By limiting descendibility to
the standard used by copyright law, we can be fairly sure that history will not become the subdivided
satrapy of descendants of once-famous people").
66. Cf Hoffman, supra note 20, at 142-43. Rarely, in a case with facts like the ones in Day and Night,
has a court required a successful plaintiff to sustain even these preliminary, elementary burdens of proof. In
general, the question of originality is ignored or taken for granted, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,
400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), treated as though it were an existential quality presumptively evidenced
by the fact of the defendant's borrowing, .g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221-22 (2d
Cir. 1978), or reduced to the level of near-fawning: "An original creation of a fictional figure played
exclusively by its creator may well be protectible. Thus Groucho Marx just being Groucho Marx, with his
moustache, cigar, slouch and leer, cannot be exploited by others." Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 25
Cal. 3d 813, 825-26, 603 P.2d 425, 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 330 (1979)(Mosk, J., concurring), quoted with
approval in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)). But see Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d 248, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961),
dicussed in Whicher, supra note 60, at 221. Cf. KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 571 (1980), noted in 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845 (1981).
67. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 122-33.
68. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F.2d 485, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
69. "A Night in the Ukraine,"... is the screenplay that Anton Chekhov did not write for the Marx
Brothers. The source of the script is Chekhov's "The Bear," that short vaudeville that made Tolstoy
laugh. If he had seen "A Night in the Ukraine," Tolstoy might have grinned all the way home to
Yasnaya Polyana. . . . As written by Mr. Vosburgh, this is a crackling compendium of Marx
Brothers comedies ....
Gussow, Theatre.- '-ol1,wood/Ukraize,' N.Y. Times, May 2, 1980, at C3, col. 1. See also notes 52, 55 supra.
But see Rich, Stage View.- Shows That Examine Showbii, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1980, § 2, at 3, col. 3. ("All the
old movie routines are down pat, but they aren't refracted through a new sensibility. . . . The authors
don't parody or comment upon the Marx Brothers. . . . This flat rehash seems superfluous and
decadent").
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in a given case should not turn on the unlettered opinion of a trial judge about the
merits of a defendant's work. Trial judges' opinions in matters of this sort are
notoriously apt to be foolish or bourgeois or both or worse. And as long as a plain-
tiff's claim is accepted without substantial inquiry into its underlying merits, the
effect of the law will be to create an undeserved presumption in favor of plaintiffs
which will cast the burden of proof and persuasion alike on defendants and will
subject us all to the risk of exactly the sort of judgment we see in the Day and Aght
case.
Meanwhile, the most startling fact about the law of publicity is that, until
claims like these began to be recognized a decade or so ago, the writers in the Day
andNiht case would have had a right to do exactly as they did.70 In other words,
here is a case in which recognition of the plaintiffs' claim-which rests so far as we
can tell on no more than the commercial value of the claim itself-results in the
appropriation of what is an equally valuable interest which, until recently, would
have belonged to the defendants. And I must say that I am at a loss to understand
the casual, tendentious, self-assertive basis upon which so fundamental and
sweeping-a transfer of interests has been made. Certainly, it cannot legitimately
turn on anything as simple as a proposition about where the economic value of the
interests reside; they reside wherever the law permits them to reside.7' It simply is
not clear why suddenly the law should recognize claims in plaintiffs when recogni-
tion can come only at the expense of interests previously recognized in defend-
ants.72 The only real explanation for this anomaly appears to be that the
defendants' interests amounted to no more than individual rights in the public
domain. And as such, they received no more adequate recognition than does the
public domain itself.
What the Day andNiht case reveals, then, are two of the more serious recurring
problems in this important new field of intellectual property law. One is that the
plaintiff's action, to borrow an idea from the late Harry Kalven, lacks "profile";
the prima facie case is too indistinct, the presumption accorded to the plaintiff too
generous. 73 The second is that the defenses now available are equally too indis-
70. The point was sometimes made in the pre-Lugosi literature that "on the practical side . . . most
authors and producers of properties which exploit deceased persons obtain releases rather than lawsuits."
Donenfeld, supra note 27, at 25. But the law itself did not require such precautions:
In summary, the law as it now stands does not afford any right of action for the use of the name,
likeness or personality of a deceased person. The personal representatives and heirs of a personality
are without recourse to the courts unless their own right of privacy has been infringed.
Id at 25.
71. Cf Breyer, supra note 20, at 284-86. But see Comment, Premature Burial supra note 20, at 995-97.
The author of the Comment proposes reliance on a more general economic analysis of privacy (and, in
passing, publicity) by Professor Posner which I find largely unpersuasive but which, happily, has been
denounced in satisfactory measure by others. See generall Symposium, riajy andEconomics, 12 GA. L. REV.
393-534 (1978). See Bloustein, id at 448.
72. See Hoffman,supra note 20, at 122-23. My point here is limited to the post-death claims of succes-
sors in interest. See Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959-60 (6th Cir.
1980). Different considerations make the personal claims of a celebrity (or other person) during his lifetime
appear to be substantially less objectionable. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 133-39; cf. Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 813, 821-22, 603 P.2d 425, 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 328 (1979).
73. See Kalven, Piacy in Torts Law-Were Warren and Brandezr Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
326, 333 (1966). Cf Felcher & Rubin, Real People, supra note 29, at 1622.
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tinct; the first amendment is wholly inadequate as a tool for controlling the devel-
opment of intellectual property rights74 and there is no other defense reliably
available on more than an ad hoc basis. 75 The result of the interaction between
these two inadequacies in the law is to allow the preemption by default of substan-
tial individual rights in the public domain. As access to the public domain is
choked, or even closed off altogether, the public loses too: loses the rich heritage of
its culture, the rich presence of new works derived from that culture, and the rich
promise of works to come. If we must make room in the law for claims of publicity
rights, then we must also make an equally clear, discerning and forthcoming reser-
vation of the rights to be enjoyed freely by individuals in the public domain.
Otherwise this area of law promises to go on providing, as I think it has done in the
past ten years, examples of simple opportunism perhaps without parallel in the
history of intellectual property. 76
In the concluding section of this article, I will suggest some of the ways in
which courts ought to begin to make deliberate provision for these public domain
interests, but before I come to those suggestions, I want to pay attention to two
additional cases which shed light on other ways in which intellectual property
claims have been proliferating in recent years.
In DC Comt'cs Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 77 we see how easily the term "unfair
competition" can be invested with fresh and ironic meaning by overzealous plain-
tiffs. 78 At the Richard J. Daley campus of the City Colleges of Chicago a group of
students decided to call their school paper The Daley Planet. That they did so
having in mind the "Daily Planet" of Superman fame would have seemed prob-
able to anyone whose own childhood had occurred since the late 1930s, but, as if to
remove any doubt, the students also selected for their masthead a logo in the form
74. Although it has become conventional to discuss the right of publicity in terms of first amendment
values, e.g., Note, Fist Amendment Theory, supra note 29, the first amendment is too broad-gauged to lend
itself to useful reduction in the service of property theories. On the one hand, for example, it is likely to be
unavailable when the challenged appropriation seems "exploitative," Felcher & Rubin, Real People, supra
note 29, at 1606, 1622, or "trivial," see, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 20 at 127, even though a careful economic
assessment of public domain theory might lead to an entirely different outcome. See Memphis Develop-
ment Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959-60 (6th Cir. 1980). On the other hand, first
amendment theory itself may be insufficiently sensitive to legitimate economic interests. See Nimmer, The
Rights to Speak From Times to Time, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 957-58 (1968). But see Goetsch, Parody as Free
Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine By First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 39, 58-
66 (1980); Kulzick & Hogue, supra note 20; Patterson, supra note 3; Goldstein, supra note 19; Nimmer, supra
note 20. Cf Leavens, In Defense of the Unauthorizred Use: Recent Developments in Defending Copyright Infngement,
44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 279, 298-302 (1982).
75. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 145 ("The precise contours of the right of publicity continue to be
drawn on a case-by-case basis"). Cf Shipley, supra note 31, at 737 (suggesting categories of publicity rights
that ought to be subject to preemption but concluding that preemption will have to be worked out "on a
case-by-case basis").
76. Compare Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir.
1980) (Merritt, J.) ("Heretofore, the law has always thought that leaving a good name to one's children is
sufficient reward in itself for the individual, whether famous or not. Commercialization of this virtue after
death in the hands of heirs is contrary to our legal tradition and somehow seems contrary to the moral
presuppositions of our culture").
Compare also the prophetic (1969) warning in Liebig, supra note 27, at 46-47 (quoted at note 129 infia).
77. No. 81 C 2402 (N.D. Ill., filed June 17, 1981).
78. Compare the observation by Hoffman, supra note 62.
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of a planet as well as the motto "Truth, Justice, and the American Way." 79 There
is, in short, no question that the students were influenced by some appreciation for
the newspaper which had figured prominently in the private life of Clark Kent.
This much can be taken as a given, though the question might be asked how
anyone but the students could have cared.
As it happened, the owners of Superman did care. DC Comics, Inc., as plain-
tiff, brought suit against the Board of Trustees of Chicago's City Colleges on no
fewer than four claims of important violations of the plaintiffs interests. The first
claim was that the students' selection of the name and the slogan amounted to "a
false designation or representation as to the source of origin or sponsorship
thereof," a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.8 0 The second claim
alleged the plaintiffs ownership of a registered mark in "Daily Planet in conjunc-
tion with the Representation of a Planet for a newsletter in the form of a news-
paper dealing with comic book news and characters," and charged that "use of the
designation Daley Planet. . . [was] likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or
to deceive . . .," in violation of the Trademark Act of 1946.81 A third claim
alleged that the name Daley Planet was "likely to dilute the distinctive quality of
plaintiff's Daily Planet name and trademark and . . . [was] likely to injure the
plaintiff's business reputation," 8 2 in violation of the Illinois Anti-Dilution Statute
(to which I shall pay more particular attention later in this essay).8 3 The final
claim in the case was that the defendants' appropriations amounted to "common
law trademark infringement and unfair competition as well as deceptive trade
practices within the meaning of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act . . . in that said uses . . . [were] likely to cause confusion or misunder-
standing as to the source, sponsorship or approval of defendant's newspapers [sl"-],
and . . . [were] likely to cause confusion or misunderstanding as to the affiliation,
connection or association of Defendant with Plaintiff."84
The defendants, of course, were obliged to take each of these claims seriously
and to respond to them with earnest denials rooted firmly in law.8 5 But I am free
to recognize them for the utter nonsense they are. Legitimate works deserve protec-
tion from real threats. But claims of this kind are so extravagant in relation to the
reality from which in theory they ought to spring that one is tempted not merely to
dismiss them as nonsense, but to suggest in addition that one day one of them
ought to be made the subject of a serious counterclaim for punitive damages
rooted in some new tort designed expressly for the purpose, perhaps to be termed
"unconscionable overreaching. '86 Not, let me hasten to add, that either the plain-
79. See Defendant's Answer, DC Comics, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, No. 81 C 2402 (N.D. Ill., filed
June 17, 1981).
80. Id at 8.
81. Id at 10.
82. Id at 12.
83. See text accompanying notes 105-09 infra.
84. Defendant's Answer, DC Comics, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, No. 81 C 2402 (N.D. Ill., filed June 17,
1981), at 14.
85. See generally id.
86. Cf Gibbs, Copyright Misuse: Thirty Years Watinigfor the Other Shoe, 23 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
31, 78-79 (1973). But cf Derenberg, supra note 20, at 1213.
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tiff or the lawyers who filed the complaint in this case necessarily acted in bad
faith. There is not room in this essay for an extended review of the law of trade-
marks and unfair competition.8 7 But if I am to call attention to one unacceptable
development in the law, I must also acknowledge another, that trademark proprie-
tors and their lawyers are probably sometimes forced into unwelcome police
actions on behalf of their marks by the realistic concern that inaction can lead to a
weakened mark or even to its loss. The truth is, I am afraid, that overreaching
claims are virtually synonomous with sound trademark management. 8 If so, it
would hardly be fair to single out one recent complaint for harsh criticism derived
from a premature conception of bad faith.
But it does not follow that we must be respectful toward the claims actually
advanced in this setting. In a very real sense, they themselves are contemptuous of
the ordinary discourses one would sensibly expect a society to permit. I have
acknowledged that in selecting the name, logo and slogan for their school paper,
the students at Daley City College undoubtedly knew that the origins of their
inspiration lay partly in the development of the Superman character. At the same
time, the conversion of "Daily" to "Daley"-with its explicit invocation of the
college's own name, and perhaps an implicit suggestion of some relationship to a
colorful former Chicago mayor whom many saw as a "Superman" in his own
right--ought to be enough to signal that the students were having, as students will,
a bit of sport. Far from diluting anyone's mark, much less misleading the public,
they were simply essaying a modest joke. Even the Man of Steel must yield to
gentle humor.8 9
The immediate lesson in the Daley Planet case seems clear enough. When the
87. See generally McClure, supra note 49.
88. Consider, for example, the following advice to be found in a leading treatise in the field:
However tenuous his position, the trademark owner must take measures calculated to preserve the
distinctiveness of his mark. Many cases have turned on the owner's conduct in this regard and the fate
of his mark may depend upon his action or inaction. He must in proper time, and with proper means
protect against and take affirmative action to prevent the use of the trademark by others. He must
also make objection to the appearance of his mark in dictionaries, essays, scientific articles and the like,
though reference thereto in such publications is not conclusive proof of its generic nature. The evolu-
tion of a distinctive word into a generic term is only possible in the undisturbed course of common
usage.
The action of the trademark owner against one who makes use of his mark in a descriptive sense-
he need not be a competitor; he may be the author of a scientific article-is a typical property case.
The plaintiff sues to prevent an imminent or future loss of his trademark by dilution. In such a case,
the court must not only decide whether the defendant is likely to continue his injurious acts, but also
whether the injury, if continued, is likely to deprive the trademark of its distinctiveness; this, of course,
involves a prediction of future developments, which may be too remote to warrant consideration. In
principle, however, the issue is similar to that involved in a suit by a trademark owner against one who
uses a confusingly similar mark. In both cases, the trademark runs the risk of becoming pub cijuris.
3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES, § 74.2, at 240-43
(3d ed. 1969). But cf. Behrendt, Trademarks and Monopohls-Hirtoncal and Conceptual Foundations, 51 TRADE-
MARK REP. 853 (1961).
89. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
I should perhaps add at this point that my own, more caustic comments on this pending litigation are
meant to be taken only semi-seriously, and not at all adhominem. To be sure, I am genuinely horrified by
the sweep and direction of contemporary trademark and unfair competition law-and the Daley Planet case
is as good an example as any of what seems undesirable in this law-but still, my criticism is of theories
rather than parties. And I recognize that the plaintiffs in this litigation may yet have the last laugh.
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proprietor of a mark presumes to intrude into the relationship which the subject of
the mark may have contracted with the public in some setting essentially beyond
the proprietor's own undertakings-as Superman and all his friends and enemies
have a place in the estimation of the American public that simply has nothing to
do with the parochial interests of DC Comics, Inc.-the proprietor goes well
beyond any purpose legitimate in the law of trademarks and begins, indeed, to
engage in an appropriation of its own. It is tempting, but inadequate, to see this as
simply a corollary of the rule that trademarks are lost as they take on generic
significance. 90 The lesson in the Daey, Planet case ought to derive instead from a
more fundamental recognition of separate rights in the public domain.
Meanwhile, there are two additional lessons in this case that go beyond its own
facts. One (again) is that proprietors of trademarks and related impedimenta are
subject to natural pressures to expand the boundaries of their interests, even at the
risk of appearing silly or rapacious and not infrequently at the cost of
expropriatory incursions into the public domain. The pressures are acute; a trade-
mark exists only insofar as the proprietor can persuade the public to recognize it
from time to time.91 Proprietors cannot be expected to restrain themselves. It is all
the more essential, then, that courts respond firmly and clearly to threats to the
public domain in these cases. The second lesson is akin to the first, but is broader
in its implications. In his original article proposing a right of publicity almost
thirty years ago, Professor Nimmer warned that a broad theory of unfair competi-
tion would prove unsatisfactory as an alternative to a discrete property theory. In
essence, he argued that a broad theory could not be satisfactorily contained. 92
Our experience with the expanding boundaries of trademark and unfair competi-
tion cases shows, at least indirectly, just how right he was. Unfair competition
theory no longer is confined to its legitimate original purpose, which was to pre-
vent deception or confusion in the context of actual competition. 93 Nor is it con-
fined to its later, more doubtful task of preventing competitive
misappropriations. 94 Today, the theory has been expanded to embrace not merely
threats arising from the marketplace but threats from any quarter to an intellec-
tual property res itself infinitely protean. 95 The resulting protection guards against
the adverse consequences of unfair competition, as it always did, but it does more
than that, by far: in effect, it runs against any diminution in the value of any
hypothetical interest, and thus it converts each interest into a mutable species of
mutant property distastefully reminiscent of The Alien .96
90. See generally 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 88, § 74.2 (Supp. 198 1).
91. See id. § 84.2, at 955.
92. Nimmer, supra note 25, at 213-14.
93. See Laff & Saret, supra note 46, at 50. See generally McClure, supra note 49; cf. Stern & Hoffman,
supra note 20.
94. See Note, Copyng-Msappropriation, supra note 23, at 1458-73.
95. Cf Brown, Elegiac Reflections, supra note 20, at 1044 (commenting on the impact of Goldstein v.
California before the passage of the 1976 Act: "So instead of a shapeless tort (or crime) of misappropriation,
we have the new recognition of a state copyright power that may extend to any kind of work that is not
explicitly preempted").
96. In a sense it is somewhat misleading to refer to this kind of property as "new" since, in the form of
dilution theory at least, it has had its advocates in this country for years. See Schechter, The RationalBasis of
[Vol. 44: No. 4
RECOGNIZING PUBLIC DOMAIN
The existence of this new form of property is implied in the plaintiff's claims in
the Daey Planet case. But its existence is to be seen even more clearly in the
opinion in another case which also was filed in the Northern District of Illinois. In
Instrumenta/ist Co. v. Marne Corps League,°7 the mere threat of a dilution of the plain-
tiff's interest in a mark was held sufficient to justify injunctive relief. This was so,
as we will see, not merely in spite of or in addition to some prospect of deception or
confusion or mistake, but rather because there were no such prospects at all.
In Martne Corps League, the plaintiff was the corporate publisher of a magazine
called The Instrumentalist, described in the opinion as "a national music magazine
devoted exclusively to school band and orchestra directors and to teachers of
instrumental music." 98 Annually, for some years, The Instrumentalt had made
awards to outstanding high school band members and musicians. The awards
were called the "John Philip Sousa Band Award" and featured the name and
likeness of Sousa, reproduced in various prizes associated with the award (such as
lapel pins or marble desk pieces) as well as in the certificate itself.99 The Instrumen-
tah'st had acquired "authorization" to issue the award from Sousa's children in
1954.100 On one occasion, some twelve years later, The Instrumentalist had sought
unsuccessfully to register the Sousa likeness with the Patent Office, but it was not
Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927). But Schechter was concerned for the protection of
"distinctive" marks or names in the marketplace; there is nothing in his work to suggest that he would have
subscribed to the broader effort toward apotheosis for a mark implicit in a case like Dal Planet. Moreover,
courts had not proved receptive to dilution theory until recent years. See Patishall, The Dilution Rationalefor
Trademark, 71 Nw. UNIv. L. REv. 618, 621-22, 631-33 (1976); McClure, supra note 87, at 345. See also
Winner, supra note 29, at 205-06. Even statutes have met with judicial resistance. See 3 R. CALLMANN,
supra note 88, § 84.2, at 956-64 (Supp. 1981). Thus the appearance of cases applying dilution theory in the
absence of competition, e.g., Edgewater Beach Apts. Corp. v. Edgewater Beach Mgmt. Co., Inc., 12 Il1.
App. 3d 526, 299 N.E.2d 548 (1st Dist. 1973),followedtn Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509
F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1981), can be described as "new" though the theory itself is not. Cf 3 R.
CALLMANN, supra note 88, § 84.2 at 959-60 ("Some opinions suggest increasing judicial perception along
these lines, but the optimism they generate is negated by other opinions which demonstrate the difficulty of
'adjusting' our courts to a comparatively new concept"). Cf Winner, supra note 29, cited in note 110 tnfla.
On the nature of dilution theory, Callmann has written: "One court, construing the Illinois statute
properly remarks that . . . '[its scope] is at least as broad as infringement under the Lanham Act or unfair
competition under the Illinois law.' It is, however, much broader because it is a law which is directed not
against unfair competition as such, but against trespass on the property right in the trademark." 3 R.
CALLMANN, supra note 88, § 84.2, at 963. But cf id at 962 ("A dilution statute does not replace the
common-law of unfair competition. It merely widens and clarifies one area of unfair competition and is a
supplement to the common law rights. The statutes go further in that they provide protection against the
'likelihood of dilution' . . . ." The dilution statutes presently limit relief to the injunction. The plaintiff
cannot claim damages or seek an accounting for profits"). This is a useful and accurate summary of dilu-
tion theory up to a point. What it does not take into account, however, is that once a plaintiff has obtained
an injunction, it may then seek royalties under a license. Thus, the similarities between dilution theory and
common law copyright (or other, similar forms of intellectual property) are potentially much greater than
may at first appear. Id at 963.
Meanwhile, in a still more general sense, the laws of copyright, trademarks and unfair competition have
long been recognized as overlapping. See generaill, e.g., Laff & Saret, supra note 46; Patterson, supra note 3,
at 1193-1200; McClure, supra note 49. Cf Brown, Elegiac Reflections, supra note 20, at 1044. Compare
Whicher, supra note 60, at 219-20; Liebig, supra note 27, at 42.
97. 509 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
98. Id at 325.
99. The awards and related impedimenta actually appear to have been sold to schools which elected
to take advantage of the magazine's program; but it is clear that the awards were highly regarded by those
who received them. See id at 326, 332.
100. Id Sousa had died in 1932. The nature of the permission granted is not clear. Apparently,
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until 1973 that Sousa's name finally was made the subject of a successful
application. 101
Meanwhile, the Marine Corps League, which is affiliated with the United
States Marine Corps, also had given annual awards for outstanding musicianship.
In 1980, at the urging of its Director, a retired Marine General, the League pro-
posed to call its award the "John Philip Sousa Award for Musical Excellence." At
the time, the League knew nothing of The Instrumentalist, but when it learned of the
magazine's priority in the use of Sousa's name, it decided to change the name of its
own award to the "Semper Fidelis Award." That name the League derived from
the motto of the Corps as well as from the march which Sousa had composed while
he was still Director of the Marine Corps Band. 10 2 The League continued to use
Sousa's picture as a prominent part of its award. The award also included a bio-
graphical sketch of Sousa's association with the Marine Band.10 3
Learning of the continued uses of Sousa's name and likeness, and taking them
to be violations of understandings reached in earlier correspondence with the
League, the plaintiff brought suit alleging Lanham Act violations as well as
common law trademark infringements and unfair competition. 104 In the course of
a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff also sought the
protection of the Illinois Anti-Dilution Statute,10 5 which provides that any use of a
mark in circumstances in which "there exists a likelihood of injury to business
reputation or of dilution of a distinctive quality of. . . [a prior user's] mark" may
be enjoined "notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or
confusion as to the source of goods or services .... ,"106 In deciding whether to
issue a preliminary injunction against the League, the court found that there was
insufficient evidence of probable confusion to warrant relief on trademark or
unfair competition grounds. 10 7 But the court held that an injunction could be
issued to prevent the "dilution" forbidden by the Illinois statute. Indeed, the court
noted, the statute did not require either a likelihood of confusion or even competi-
tion between the two uses: "In fact Illinois case law indicates that the statute was
intended to operate ony where relief is unavailable under traditional theories of
unfair competition, under which likelihood of confusion and existence of competi-
tion are usually requisite elements."' 1 8 The effect of the dilution statute, then, was
to convert the very weaknesses in the plaintiffs trademark and unfair competition
claims into an advantage:
Sousa's children had engaged in some efforts to promote their father's memory on the centennial anniver-
sary of his birth. See P. BIERLY, JOHN PHILIP SOUSA: AMERICAN PHENOMENON 215-17 (1973).
101. 509 F. Supp. at 326. The application was filed in 1973; the certificate issued in 1976. As the
court noted, a service mark registration might have seemed more appropriate in the circumstances of the
case, set id at 325 n. 1, 326, but if so that does not appear to have been the magazine's fault; the application
originally called for a service mark but was amended "in reponse to Patent and Trademark Office Actions
.
d. at 326.
102. See id at 326-27. See also P. BIERLY, supra note 100, at 47.
103. 509 F. Supp. at 327.
104. Id at 325.
105. 509 F. Supp. at 327; Illinois Trademarks Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (Supp. 1981-82).
106. Illinois Trademarks Act., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (Supp. 1981-82).
107. 509 F. Supp. at 327-31.
108. Id at 332 [emphasis in original]. See id at 331-32.
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[Although (or perhaps because) Instrumentalist has not shown the requisite likelihood of
confusion to support an injunction under the Lanham Act, Instrumentalist may still obtain
relief under the Illinois Anti-Dilution statute provided it demonstrates a "likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits" as to whether the Semper Fidelis Award "dilutes" the Sousa Award.1 0 9
Given the thrust of the statute, it will surprise no one to learn that the court found
that the League's use of the name and likeness of John Philip Sousa in connection
with its award would tend to "dilute" the "distinctiveness" of the plaintiff's mark.
It is surely unnecessary to comment at length on this case. The Marine
Corps-which gave birth and direction to Sousa's musical career, which sustained
him as he composed some of his most important marches, and from whose own
motto he appropriated the title to one of the most memorable of his works-may
not draw "prominent" attention to its relationship with the composer because of
the adventitious earlier use of his name and likeness by an obscure band magazine
licensed to those uses by the composer's children. The case is a paradigm. The
result speaks for itself. But what makes Manne Corps League truly archetypal
among the forces at play in contemporary intellectual property theory is the vir-
tual absence of recognizable legal principle in this result. Indifferent to discovery
or invention, indifferent as well to deception or confusion or competition, but
responsive to mere priority, the law of dilution tugs at its own bootstraps and suc-
ceeds in lowering itself to a level of supervenience at which all thought of the
public domain has been lost. 1 0
III
I have sketched, in deliberately impressionistic fashion, some directions in the
field of intellectual property which I believe to have been taken unwisely in recent
years. I have meant to convey two principal objections to the new thrust of the
law. One is that it tends to reward a species of claim which almost always lacks
definition and frequently lacks either a substantial showing of entitlement or any
realistic evidence of a taking. The other is that the very momentum of these
expanding claims tends to blur, and then displace, important individual and col-
lective rights in the public domain."'
The plaintiffs in these cases rarely are in a position to demonstrate the extent of
their inventions. Bella Lugosi was not the first actor to impersonate a figure of
horror; the Marx Brothers were not the only vaudevillians to move from split
weeks in Waukegan to success on a wider stage. How much did they borrow?
How much did they create? The proprietors of Superman may be in a position to
109. Id at 332.
110. But see Winner, supra note 29, at 205-06 (noting Martne Corps League with favor, characterizing it
as an "exception rather than the rule," and offering a more general defense of "undiluted dilution" theory).
Ms. Winner's article is of additional interest in that it suggests an explicit link between dilution theory and
the right of publicity. See generally id Cf Laff & Saret, supra note 46, at 55.
111. "Emphasis on the protected domain leads to neglect of the public domain." Brown, Uniftation,
supra note 20, at 1093. See also B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 76-77.
For a suggested comparison between individual and collective interests in the copyright field, see Pat-
terson, Copyright and the ub/h& Interest in A. KENT & H. LANCOUR, supra note 20, at 48. See also Goldstein,
supra note 19, at 1014-15. Cf Krasilovsky, supra note 20, at 213 ("The public in whose interest the public
domain is established wears several hats ... the manufacturer-producer ... the creative artist. .. [and]
the consuming public . . .").
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show that their predecessors did invent the name "Daily Planet," but they have
not suffered any taking. And in the case of John Philip Sousa, his career cannot
sensibly be made the exclusive property of anyone. As with any other figure in
American history, he belongs to the American people, individually as well as col-
lectively, and I would think to the United States Marine Corps, to whom he owed
much, as well.
I take satisfaction in knowing that Groucho Marx would have agreed with
these objections completely. He voiced them himself in a letter he wrote to Jack
and Harry Warner in the course of pre-production for A Niht in Casablanca. The
Warners were claiming a proprietary interest in the title Casablanca which, they
said, would be adversely affected if the Marx Brothers released their picture under
its proposed title. "Dear Warner Brothers," Groucho replied:
Apparently there is more than one way of conquering a city and holding it as your own.
For example, up to the time that we contemplated making this picture, I had no idea that
the city of Casablanca belonged exclusively to Warner Brothers. However, it was only a
few days after our announcement appeared that we received your long, ominous legal docu-
ment warning us not to use the name Casablanca.
It seems that in 1471, Ferdinand Balboa Warner, your great-great-grandfather, while
looking for a shortcut to the city of Burbank, had stumbled on the shores of Africa and,
raising his alpenstock (which he later turned in for a hundred shares of the common),
named it Casablanca.
Ijust don't understand your attitude. Even if you plan on rereleasing your picture, I am
sure that the average movie fan could learn in time to distinguish between Ingrid Bergman
and Harpo. I don't know whether I could, but I certainly would like to try. 112
There was more. Warming to his subject, he continued:
You claim you own Casablanca and that no one else can use that name without your
permission. What about "Warner Brothers"? Do you own that, too? You probably have
the right to use the name Warner, but what about Brothers? Professionally, we were
brothers long before you were. We were touring the sticks as The Marx Brothers when
Vitaphone was still a gleam in the inventor's eye, and even before us there had been other
brothers-the Smith Brothers; the Brothers Karamazov; Dan Brothers, an outfielder with
Detroit; and "Brother, Can you Spare a Dime?" (This was originally "Brothers, Can You
Spare a Dime?" but this was spreading a dime pretty thin, so they threw out one brother,
gave all the money to the other one and whittled it down to, "Brother, Can You Spare a
Dime?").
Now Jack, how about you? Do you maintain that yours is an original name? Well, it's
not. It was used long before you were born. Offhand, I can think of two Jacks-there was
Jack of "Jack and the Beanstalk," and Jack the Ripper, who cut quite a figure in his day.
As for you, Harry, you probably sign your checks, sure in the belief that you are the first
Harry of all time and that all other Harrys are imposters. I can think of two Harrys that
preceded you. There was Lighthouse Harry of Revolutionary fame and a Harry Appel-
baum who lived on the corner of 93rd Street and Lexington Avenue. Unfortunately,
Appelbaum wasn't too well known. The last I heard of him, he was selling neckties at
Weber and Heilbroner. 113
But Groucho was willing to entertain the thought that the Warners themselves
might be innocent:
This all seems to add up to a pretty bitter tirade, but I assure you it's not meant to. I
love Warners. Some of my best friends are Warner Brothers. It is even possible that I am
112. THE GROUCHO LErERS 14 (A. Sheedman ed. 1967).
113. Id at 14-15.
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doing you an injustice and that you, yourselves, know nothing at all about this dog-in-the-
Wanger attitude. It wouldn't surprise me at all to discover that the heads of your legal
department are unaware of this absurd dispute, for I am acquainted with many of them
and they are fine fellows with curly black hair, double-breasted suits and a love of their
fellow man that out-Saroyans Saroyan.
I have a hunch that this attempt to prevent us from using the title is the brainchild of
some ferret-faced shyster, serving a brief apprenticeship in your legal department. I know
the type well-hot out of law school, hungry for success and too ambitious to follow the
natural laws of promotion. This bar sinister probably needled your attorneys, most of
whom are fine fellows with curly black hair, double-breasted suits, etc., into attempting to
enjoin us. Well, he won't get away with it! We'll fight him to the highest court! No pasty-
faced legal adventurer is going to cause bad blood between the Warners and the Marxes.
We are all brothers under the skin and we'll remain friends till the last reel of "A Night in
Casablanca" goes tumbling over the spool."
4
In the last paragraph of his letter, I have a hunch Groucho may have given us
an example of what Professor Kalven called "an insight more fundamental than
we can use."' ' 5 But at least the suggestion that the public could be relied on to do
its own refereeing among claims was sound advice when he offered it and still is. 116
In this final portion of my own essay, I will suggest some other ways courts might
respond when unwarranted claims of intellectual property are advanced.
First, courts might begin to deal with overreaching plaintiffs as competent par-
ents learn in time to deal with greedy children, by saying "no." In some instances,
the negative response ought to be categorical; dilution theory as reflected in Mane
Corps League, for example, is probably always unsound. 117 In this area, and others
affected by statutes, courts should be particularly attentive to the possibility of
preemption under the 1976 Copyright Act." 8 Claims of injury to business reputa-
tion presumably would be beyond the reach of preemption;" 9 but section 301
would appear to allow preemption of at least as much of state dilution laws as are
114. Id at 16.
115. Kalven, Broadcastihg, Rublic Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & EcON. 15, 30 (1967).
116. Cf B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 57 ("Passing off theory is naturally invoked when the copyright
theory seems thin, but will often be found a pretense, the public being neither concerned nor confused
about source").
117. If dilution theory were confined strictly so as to apply only to appropriations of highly distinctive
marks in the course of marketplace transactions---essentially as Schechter himself seems to have envisioned,
see note 96 supra-then perhaps it would prove less troublesome. But it would still be subject to criticism
on grounds of lack of adequate definitional precision. Cf Laff & Saret, supra note 46, at 50-56.
118. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. 1 1977):
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right
or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of
any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.
119. Rights in reputation would not normally be "equivalent" to the sort of property rights protected
by § 106 of the Act, and thus would be exempt from preemption pursuant to the terms of§ 301(b)(3). See
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 132. Se also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1.01[B], at 1-13.
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protective of property-equivalent interests expressed in tangible form. 120 Professor
David Shipley has published an article recently in which he has carefully demon-
strated how publicity theory also is vulnerable to preemption under section 301.121
In general, preemption should be recognized readily, not grudgingly, in all permis-
sible fields of intellectual property theory, and as broadly as the limits of section
301 permit. 122 Even when a categorical negative response appears unwise, a court
should not hesitate to say "no" in less sweeping terms. One writer has suggested,
for example, that a fair use doctrine be applied to publicity theory to augment the
inadequate defenses now available in that field. 123 Meanwhile, courts must be
sensitive to the taking too trivial to be actionable 124 as well as the taking which
produces apportionable profits.12 5 In doubtful cases, for reasons I have previously
addressed, the defendant ought always to prevail.
120. See Brown, Unifcatzon, supra note 20, at 1097-99; cf Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involunta v
Transfers and Compulsory Licenses. Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1107, 1116-17 (1977).
This would appear to be so even though most of the expression protected by dilution theory probably
would be ineligible for copyright protection as such because of its insubstantiality. See H.R. REP., supra
note 5, at 131; Goldstein, supra, at 1119 n.52; I M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1.01[B], at 1-21, 1-24 n.106.
121. Shipley, supra note 31. Professor Shipley's analysis "suggest[s] that state common law publicity
interests in performance, likenesses, characters, and characterizations are subject to preemption by federal
copyright law." Id at 710. He is persuasively critical of recent judicial opinions which have failed to
recognize the relationship between preemption and publicity. See id at 708-09 n.252. See also Hoffman,
supra note 20, at 130-33.
122. See Brown, Unification, supra note 20, at 1093-99. Professor Brown offers a particularly important
comment on the value of preemption in the context of an equally important insight into the nature of the
public domain:
What has this to do with preemption? Are not the states as capable of protecting the public domain as
is the Congress? The answer, from my observation, is no. Suitors before state courts and legislatures
are interested in extending the protected domain; and one has to look hard to find state statutes or
decisions running counter to these pressures. Congress is of course equally besieged by interests seeking
protection. But it hears other voices. . . . Congress can and does preempt works of authorship,
forcing them into the public domain as well as into the protected domain; and some reasonable impli-
cation is permissible to find that it has done so.
Id at 1093-94. See also id at 1105-06; Note, Copyright Law Revision, supra note 20, at 631-32. But see Note,
supra note 13, at 323-24.
123. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 139-45. One difficulty with this suggestion is that, in conventional
modern copyright usage, fair use often presupposes a protected interest. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 5,
§ 13.05[A], at 13-55 to -56. Thus, an incautious reliance on fair use could lead to the undesirable result of
recognizing as protectible, initially, interests which might better be judged lacking in protection altogether.
This is not a compelling reason for rejecting an essentially useful suggestion, however, particularly if courts
prove willing to heed the additional advice by its author that the fair use doctrine in publicity should be
developed with publicity theory itself specifically in mind. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 140.
Meanwhile, an interesting suggestion advanced in other articles is that the burden of proof in fair use
cases should be shifted to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Kulzick & Hogue, supra note 20, at 77-78; Rosenfeld,
Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 790, 804 (1975). See also
Brenner, supra note 2, at 46 (because creative originality may be less than in copyright, "allowances for 'fair
use' would be more freely granted in a right-of-publicity case;" fair use also suggested for the inventive
imitator).
124. Cf Brown, Unifcation, supra note 20, at 1097-98. Professor Brown argues that there are "levels of
authorship that are public-domain preempted" by section 301 of the Copyright Act even though they are
not specifically enumerated or identified in the Act. Id at 1096 [emphasis in original]. They include both
"the high-level paradise of ideas, concepts, and principles" and "the low-level inferno of things too small or
routine for copyright." Id Compare Note, Copyright Law Revision, supra note 20, at 624-25, 626 n.96;
Leavens, supra note 74, at 280-81.
125. This concept, of course, is already well established in copyright law. See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER,
supra note 5, § 14.03[C].
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Second, courts ought to indulge at least a presumption against new claims.
Perhaps it is too much to reject them categorically. It is not too much, however, to
erect barriers not to be hurdled by plaintiffs relying on casual proof. Important
questions ought to be asked of the plaintiff who seeks to establish a prima facie
case. In what legitimate sense did that plaintiff's predecessors actually create the
interests for which protection now is sought? How can these interests clearly be
identified and confined? The court must ask itself some equally important ques-
tions. For what length of time is it appropriate to reward such efforts at creativity
as are demonstrated in the case? 126 What test of invention should the proponent of
a claim be required to meet? Is it too much to impose a requirement virtually
amounting to uniqueness, as was suggested by the court in Estate of Hemingway? 12 7
To be sure, that would exceed the usual requirements in copyright; but are not
fragmentary or ephemeral interests more tentative in their claim to recognition?
And is it not fair, then, to expect their proponents to show more?' 28 Third, as an
additional part of the plaintiff's prima facie case, it would seem fair to require the
submission of proof concerning the likely impact that recognition of the plaintiff's
claim might have on subsequent claims. For example, if rights are to be recog-
nized in the creative efforts of the Marx Brothers, it would seem important to ask
not only how much of their characters they invented themselves, but also how
many subsequent generations of performers might be adversely affected if protec-
tion were now to be accorded to the Marx Brothers' successors. The analogy that
comes to mind is the environmental impact statement that must be prepared
when, for example, government agencies propose to make some doubtful use of
lands. The purpose of these statements is generally to require that, as against the
uncontrolled ravages wrought in earlier times, would-be users today assure us that
their proposals will not heedlessly affect the interests of individuals in generations
to come.' 29 The analogy here seems apt; in certain useful respects the public
126. For other suggestions, see Saret & Stern, supra note 29, at 697-98; Hoffman, supra note 20, at 142-
45; Note, supra note 13, at 323-34. Recent opinions posing these and other, similar challenges or questions
also can be found. See, e.g., Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). Com-
pare, again, the intriguing possibilities in shifting burdens of proof in fair use cases, thus converting the
principles of an affirmative defense into principles of presumptive entitlement. See note 123 supra.
127. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 349, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255,
256, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 778, 779 (1968). See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
128. Cf Brown, Unification, supra note 20, at 1097-98. See also Note, supra note 13, at 295-96 ("that a
lesser requirement is necessary for the protection of copyrighted material reflects the pervasive public
interest in encouraging authors to copyright and to disclose their material. Were the same lenient stan-
dards applicable to ideas through common-law protection, the motivation to obtain copyright would be
drastically reduced"). But see 1 M. NIMMER, upra note 13.
129. See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973).
A California practitioner, writing some years ago in response to then-recent litigation involving Nancy
Sinatra and the Fifth Dimension, captured the essence of the concerns expressed in the text at this point:
From the standpoint of performers. . . the right to perform in the popular genre or style is essen-
tial. Freedom of a performer to earn a living by adopting-either consciously or because he is "influ-
enced" or simply "with it"--current modes and styles which may be widely or even uniformly
demanded is, indeed, imperative. How else can he support himself and develop? Any limitation upon
absolute freedom of performance-while it might result in short-lived bonanzas for one or two per-
formers--would self evidently be stultifying to performers as a class.
Just how stultifying becomes clear when one considers the predictable volume of litigation and
threatened litigation which would follow from any such limitation coupled with the equally predict-
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domain in the field of intellectual property today can be compared to the public
grazing lands on the Western plains of a century ago. 130 Indeed, so insubstantial is
the stuff of intellectual property that the more insistent image is not the sturdier
lands of the American West but the more fragile tundra of the Alaskan North:
wild, vast, inaccessible, beautiful, but singularly unsuited to colonization. 131 If it
is fair, as we seem to have decided in this century it is, to require the users of public
lands to prepare impact statements as a condition of their use, then perhaps it is
also fair to require similar assurances before we permit the outright appropriation
of -the territory of the creative subconscious. 132
Fourth, it would be possible, and occasionally desirable, for courts to appoint
counsel to act, in effect, as guardian ad litem for the public domain in cases in
which new intellectual property interests are being advanced. 133 At the least,
courts should solicit and welcome amicus participation.
Fifth, in cases in which it appears sensible to recognize new (or doubtful) intel-
lectual property claims, it will be appropriate for the court to explain what is not
able inconsistency of result. After several hundred years copyright infringement, which involves only
comparison of dimensional self-described works, is still a mystery . . . . We could hardly expect the
courts to set parameters and fashion workable, understandable standards of comparison in "imitation"
cases in this century! In the meantime, what about the performers and artists and their disseminators
who wish to go about their business unhindered?
From the standpoint of the audience, society at large, and cultural growth, encroachment on the
freedom of performance would be destructive both qualitatively and quantitatively. Consider any
artist, musician, or performer of any era and ponder what his oeuvre would have amounted to had he
been precluded from utilizing the brush techniques, color principles, scales, metres, cadences, sounds,
moods and methods---in short, the styles-of those who have gone before. Would the classical periods
of music and painting have been limited to but one producer each? Would Presley have been fore-
closed as an imitator or would he have had the right to foreclose those who came after him? Would
the lost generation of American writers have wasted itself in litigation to determine who "got with it"
first? Indeed, could there have been a Renaissance? Would we have had a Brahms, a Rubens, a
Steinbeck? Or, for that matter, a Sinatra or Fifth Dimension?
Liebig, supra note 27, at 46-47.
130. Or to public lands of other sorts. See Krasilovsky, supra note 20, at 205, 225-26.
131. But ef id. at 225-26 (suggesting the development of the Alaskan crab and shrimp industries as
examples of how a federal bureau might be established to manage, conserve and develop the public
domain). If this alarming suggestion were followed, impact statements would be even more relevant.
I should perhaps say clearly at this point that of course I do not mean to be taken literally when I
suggest an analogy to public lands. Proposals of that sort too quickly lead to analysis rooted in reductive
nonsense. Cf Comment, Premature Burial, supra note 20, at 996-97.
132. One author has used the term "public commons" to describe "the raw materials from which
creative imaginations must work" and which therefore cannot be "fenced in" in any circumstances.
Carman, supra note 20, at 58, 59. Cf Nimmer, supra note 20, at 266.
133. Cf Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?- Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
450 (1972).
I would not advocate "cheap" standing, and particularly not when derived from an environmental law
analogy; clearly, that analogy can lend itself as readily to an argument for new property interests as against
them. See Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the Caifornia Art reservation Act as a Modelfor
Statutory Reform, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 873, 888-90 (1981). Still, there are times when something
amounting to guardianship protection does seem necessary. It is a small scandal, for example, that the
Betamax litigation has moved all the way to the Supreme Court on an assessment of in-home recording as
fair use apparently without a single genuine in-home defendant in the case. See Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd in part and afd in part , 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981),cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3973 (U.S. June 14, 1982) (No. 81-1687). See Note, Betamax and Infringement
of Television Copright, 1977 DuKE L. J. 1181, 1184 n.16.
[Vol. 44: No. 4
Page 147: Autumn 1981] RECOGNIZING PUBLIC DOMAIN
covered by the grant as well. An explicit reservation of the public domain in these
circumstances must be seen as a part of the court's obligation to be clear about the
holding in the case rather than as a mere exercise in advisory opinion writing. 34
Precision in drafting the terms of a conveyance is essential in any property case;
and legal descriptions often define what is to be included by referring explicitly to
that which is to be excluded. In this sense, the proposal here is entirely unremark-
able. But there is an even greater need for efforts aimed at precision in defining
intellectual property. As we have seen, the subject matter itself is inherently less
susceptible to recognition than are most forms of property. Interests in the public
domain, meanwhile, are rarely advanced first in their own right. Such definition
as they now have tends to come only through derivation and intuition, available
more often in cases establishing or extending property interests than in cases lim-
iting them.135 In contrast to the interests which receive recognition, the public
domain tends to appear amorphous and vague, with little more of substance in it
than is invested in patriotic or religious slogans on paper currency. It is this
impression of insubstantiality that courts must dispel first. Inevitably, the work of
defining the public domain (which is essentially beyond the scope of this essay) will
follow and, we can hope, a more appropriate balance will be restored to the field of
intellectual property.
Finally, as often as possible, courts ought to divert claims away from intellec-
tual property theory and into such adjacent areas of law as the original form of
unfair competition, contracts or, perhaps, some species of moral rights. There can
be little damage to the public domain in requiring precautions designed to prevent
genuine deception or confusion; Sears and Compco would have permitted as
much. 136 Nor does there seem to be any legitimate objection to moral rights
requirements such as attribution of authorship, although rights against distortion,
truncation, mutilation and the like are obviously another matter. 137 In California,
134. Cf Note, supra note 13, at 324.
135. See Brown, Unifwation, supra note 20, at 1093.
136. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); Brown, Unifcation, supra note 20, at 1097-98.
137. Of course, the initial question in any "moral rights" case is whether rights of this sort are to be
recognized explicitly. See general'y 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8.21. See also Diamond, Legal Protectionfor
the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADE-MARK REP. 244 (1978). In general, I should
think, the law ought to distinguish between "moral rights" which serve to insure recognition for the more
personal investment of an artist, cf. Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 183-84, 122 N.Y.S. 206,
207-08 (1910) (Seabury, J.) (attribution of authorship) and "moral rights" which have the effect of pro-
tecting some form of exclusive possessory interest, cf Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d
14, 23-25 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1976) ("artistic deformation" not adequately addressed by disclaimer as to original
authorship). Rights of the latter sort clearly may be in potential conflict with individual rights in the
public domain and ought therefore to be recognized more carefully. Compare, e.g., Gantz, supra note 133.
Cf Jaszi, supra note 17, at 753-58. One writer, considering the California Resale Royalties Act in terms of
its susceptibility to § 301 preemption, has made a serious effort to take the public domain into account; the
effort is commendable although her conclusion-that preemption is not required--may be doubted. See
Note, The Caliornia Resale Royalties Act as a Test Case for Preemption Under the 1976 Copyright Law, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1315, 1328-32 (1981). Compare Katz, supra note 60, at 219-22.
It may be that the key to defining the scope of the public domain in a satisfactory way is to be found in
a comparison of the natural law (or "moral") basis of intellectual property with the more specific, occa-
sional need to define and provide for certain economic or commercial interests not necessarily limited to
authors and not necessarily the products of authorship. Compare Streibich, Moral Right of Ownershit to
Intellectual Property: (Part !) From the Beginning to the Age of Printing, 6 MeM. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1975) and (Part
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meanwhile, the supreme court's decision in Lugosi that publicity rights are alien-
able personal interests, but as such do not survive the death of the original pos-
sessor,1 38 is evidence that courts can respect the public domain while remaining
responsive to the legitimate arguments raised by Professor Nimmer in 1954.
Indeed, California has a unique history of recognizing the public domain, which is
exemplified in that supreme court's careful holdings limiting the subject matter of
ideas to the protection of true contract theory.13 a
These suggestions are not meant to be exhaustive,' 4° but if courts were to act
on them they would begin to offset the more egregious consequences of the new
currents in intellectual property theory. The problems will not be resolved until
courts have come to see the public domain not merely as an unexplored abstrac-
tion but as a field of individual rights fully as important as any of the new property
rights. The field of intellectual property law at large sometimes seems to be
beyond the possibility of exhaustion. But then, that was the view taken by the
public toward the buffalo as they were being hunted one hundred years ago. And
where are the buffalo now?
II) From the Age of Prfintig to the Future, 7 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 45 (1976) with L. PATTERSON, supra note 20.
See L. PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 215-21. Cf B. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 78; Krasilovsky, supra note 20,
at 216-17; Katz, supra note 60, at 217-22. See also Comment, Copyright Preemption and Character Values, supra
note 20, at 1037.
138. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 813, 820-24, 603 P.2d 425, 429-31, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 327-29 (1979).
139. See Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 734-39, 299 P.2d 257, 267-70 (1956); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser,
40 Cal. 2d 778, 794-95, 256 P.2d 947, 959 (1953); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 245 Cal. App.
2d 593, 604-06, 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 137-38 (1966). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 5, §§ 16.01-.05. Com-
pare Liebig, supra note 27, at 42. But cf Note, supra note 13.
140. Compare the suggestions advanced in Krasilovsky, supra note 20, at 228.
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